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URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c10254The largest growth in entitlement program spending in the United States
over the past ﬁfteen years has been in the Medicaid program, which pro-
vides health insurance to low-income populations. In 1984, the Medicaid
program spent $38 billion, which was 4.4 percent of the federal budget in
that year and 0.97 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) and covered
22 million persons. By 2001, the program was projected to spend $219 bil-
lion, which is 10.8 percent of the federal budget and 2.3 percent of GDP,
and to cover 40 million persons. This astronomical growth is particularly
striking in light of another important trend over the past ﬁfteen years: a
continued steady rise in the fraction of the nonelderly population without
health insurance. From 1988 through 1998, this share rose by almost 20
percent, before leveling out in recent years (Employee Beneﬁts Research
Institute [EBRI] 2000).
These facts raise a number of interesting and important questions about
the purpose and structure of the third largest entitlement program in the
United States (trailing only Social Security and Medicare). Medicaid is in
fact really four public insurance programs in one. The ﬁrst provides cover-
age of most medical expenses for low-income women and children fami-
lies; this function absorbs only about one-quarter of program dollars but
encompasses two-thirds of program enrollees. The second is a program
that provides public insurance for the portions of medical expenditures not
covered by the Medicare program for the low-income elderly. The third is
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Robert Moﬃtt for helpful comments.The last is a program that pays the nursing home expenditures of many
of the institutionalized elderly. These last three functions apply to only
one-third of beneﬁciaries but use three-quarters of program dollars. This
panoply of functions has led to uneven program growth and some confu-
sion about the mission of the program and how it integrates with other
public insurance institutions.
In this chapter, I will review the structure of the Medicaid program and
its economic impact. I start in part 1.1 by reviewing program history, and
discussing the evolution and current structure of program rules. In part
1.2, I then turn to a more detailed discussion of the program as it currently
exists, presenting a variety of statistics on enrollment and expenditures.
Part 1.3 then provides a heuristic overview of the economic impacts of the
Medicaid program, and part 1.4 reviews the large empirical literature on
the Medicaid program and its impacts on health care utilization, health, la-
bor supply, family structure, and other behaviors. Part 1.5 then discusses
current policy issues and how they are informed (or not informed) by the
existing literature. Part 1.6 concludes.
1.1 Program History, Rules, and Goals
In this section, I will review the historical evolution and current struc-
ture of program rules. In doing so, I will draw primarily on two invaluable
sources. The ﬁrst is the Green Book (U.S. Congress, Committee on Ways
and Means 2000; hereafter GB), a generally invaluable source for under-
standing the current operation of this program (and most other social pro-
grams as well). The second is the Yellow Book (Congressional Research
Service 1993; hereafter YB), a source that provides a more detailed inves-
tigation of the Medicaid program itself.
1.1.1 Origin and Goals of the Medicaid Program
The Medicaid program was created by the Social Security Amendments
of 1965, the same legislation that created the Medicare program of health
insurance for the elderly. Medicaid and Medicare replaced two earlier pro-
grams of federal grants to states to provide medical care to low-income
persons, one for welfare recipients, and the other for the aged. Combined
spending on these programs was $1.3 billion in 1965.
The new Medicaid program continued the tradition of allowing states
substantial latitude to design their own programs, subject to federal mini-
mum standards. Eligibility was largely conﬁned to the populations tradi-
tionally eligible for welfare—single-parent families, and the aged, blind,
and disabled. But there were two important early exceptions, foreshadow-
ing larger exceptions to arise in the 1980s. The ﬁrst was the “Ribicoﬀ chil-
dren”: States could choose to cover children who met the ﬁnancial stan-
dards of welfare programs but not the categorical standards (e.g., because
16 Jonathan Gruberthey were in a two-parent family). The second was the “medically needy,”
populations whose income was above the eligibility standards but who had
very high medical bills. States were initially given no upper limit for eligi-
ble incomes. States were also given latitude about when to join the pro-
gram. As table 1.1, from Decker (1994) shows, although a number of states
joined immediately in January 1966, states phased in steadily over the next
four years, and the last state, Arizona, did not join the Medicaid program
until 1982.
The history of federal Medicaid legislation is presented in table 1.2, from
YB. This history presents a striking proﬁle of continuous expansions and
contractions in program generosity, sometimes within the same legislation.
This is exempliﬁed by the 1967 legislation that limited how generous states
could be within their medically needy programs, but at the same time es-
tablished one of the most important features of the Medicaid beneﬁts
package, the Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnostic, and Treatment
Program (EPSDT) to improve child health. Another feature of this legisla-
tion was a move away from state restrictions on who Medicaid patients
could see for their care, toward allowing those patients to use any provider
of their choice (if the provider was willing to take Medicaid patients). This
is striking because it was roughly thirty years later that states began to
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Table 1.1 The Introduction of Medicaid by State
State(s)
1966
January HI, IL, MN, ND, OK, PA
March CA
July CT, ID, KY, LA, ME, MD, OH, RI, UT, VT, WA, WV, WI
September MA




July IA, KS, MT, NV, NY, OR, WY
September TX







January AL, AR, FL, IN, MS, NJ, NC
1972
September AK
Note: Arizona began a special managed-care Medicaid program in the early 1980s.Table 1.2 Major Medicaid Legislation, 1965 to 1997
Description
Social Security of 1965 Established the Medicaid program
Social Security Amendments  Limited ﬁnancial standards for the medically needy; established the 
of 1967 EPSDT program to improve child health; permitted Medicaid
beneﬁciaries to use providers of their choice
Act of 14 December 1971 Allowed states to cover services in ICFs and ICFs for the mentally 
retarded
Social Security Amendments  Repealed 1965 provision requiring states to move toward 
of 1972 comprehensive Medicaid coverage; allowed states to cover care
for beneﬁciaries under age twenty-two in psychiatric hospitals
Medicare-Medicaid Anti-Fraud  Established Medicaid Fraud Control Units
and Abuse Amendments 
of 1977
Mental Health Systems  Required most states to develop a computerized Medicaid 
Act, 1980 Management Information System
Omnibus Reconciliation Act  Boren amendment permitted states to establish payment systems 
of 1980 for nursing home care in lieu of Medicare’s rules
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation  Enacted three-year reductions in federal matching percentages for 
Act of 1981 states whose spending exceeded growth targets; established
Section 1915(b) and 1915(c) waiver programs; extended the
Boren amendment to inpatient hospital services; eliminated
special penalties for noncompliance with EPSDT requirements
and gave states with Medically Needy programs broader
authority to limit coverage
Deﬁcit Reduction Act of 1984 Eliminated categorical test for certain pregnant women and young 
children
Consolidated Omnibus Budget  Extended coverage to all pregnant women meeting AFDC ﬁnancial 
Reconciliation Act of 1985 standards
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation  Allowed coverage of pregnant women and young children to 100 
Act of 1986 percent of poverty; established a new optional category of QMBs
Medicare and Medicaid Patient  Strengthened authorities to sanction and exclude providers
and Program Protection Act 
of 1987
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation  Allowed coverage of pregnant women and infants to 185 percent of 
Act of 1987 poverty; strengthened quality-of-care standards and monitoring
of nursing homes; strengthened OBRA 1981 requirements that
states provide additional payment to hospitals treating a
disproportionate share of low-income patients
Medicare Catastrophic  Mandated coverage of pregnant women and infants to 100 percent 
Coverage Act of 1988 of poverty; expanded coverage of low-income Medicare
beneﬁciaries; established special eligibility rules for
institutionalized persons whose spouse remained in the
community to prevent “spousal impoverishment”
Family Support Act of 1988 Extended work transition coverage for families losing AFDC 
because of increased earnings and expanded coverage for two-
parent families whose principal earner was unemployed
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation  Mandated coverage of pregnant women and children under age six 
Act of 1989 to 133 percent of poverty; expanded EPSDT program
requirements; mandated coverage and full-cost reimbursement of
federally qualiﬁed health centers (FQHCs)move back to this pre-1967 system through the use of managed care con-
tracting. This legislation also highlights directly the three policy levers that
are available to policymakers to change the generosity of the Medicaid
program: eligibility, the construction of the beneﬁts package, and reim-
bursement of providers.
1.1.2 Eligibility for Nonelderly and Nondisabled
Eligibility for the Medicaid program has evolved substantially over time.
As noted above, eligibility was originally restricted to those receiving cash
welfare payments, along with Ribicoﬀ children and the medically needy.
These base populations of eligibles are still in place, and they were the main
populations covered until the mid-1980s; there were some other special op-
tions to cover women without children who met the Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC) income criteria for the expenses of their
pregnancy only (Currie and Gruber 1996b), but these groups were very
small.
Beginning in 1984, however, the program began to expand eligibility for
all children and for pregnant women; that is, among women these expan-
sions applied only to the expenses of pregnancy. Changes in Medicaid pol-




Omnibus Budget Reconciliation  Phased in coverage of children ages six through eighteen to 100 
Act of 1990 percent of poverty; expanded coverage of low-income Medicare
beneﬁciaries; established Medicaid prescription drug rebate
program
Medicaid Voluntary  Restricted use of provider donations and taxes as state share of 
Contribution and Provider- Medicaid spending; limited disproportionate share hospital 
Speciﬁc Tax Amendments  payments
of 1991
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation  Mandated that individuals must spend their assets down to a state-
Act of 1993 established level before Medicaid pays for nursing facilities and
other medical care; established designation of disproportionate
share hospitals to facilities in which Medicaid beneﬁciaries
account for at least 1 percent of the hospital’s inpatient days
Personal Responsibility and  Introduced TANF, a cash welfare block grant to states that used the 
Work Opportunity Act of  same application as Medicaid; severed the automatic link 
1996 between AFDC and Medicaid; narrowed the eligibility criteria
for disabled children
Balanced Budget Act of 1997 Guaranteed continued Medicaid eligibility for children with 
disabilities who are expected to lose their SSI eligibility as a result
of restrictions enacted in 1996; permitted states to create a new
category (with a sliding scale premium) for individuals with
incomes up to 250 percent of poverty who would, but for income,
be eligible for SSIto mid-1987, was a period of incremental increases in Medicaid eligibility
for populations that had similar ﬁnancial circumstances to AFDC families
but did not meet the eligibility criterion for other reasons. This began a
gradual weakening of the linkage between AFDC coverage and eligibility
for Medicaid. This occurred both at the state level—for example, through
expansions of the Ribicoﬀ option1—and at the federal level, through the
1984 Department for Environment, Food, and Rural Aﬀairs (DEFRA)
and 1985 Consolidated Omnibus Reconciliation Act (COBRA) legislation.
The second era, from mid-1987 to the present, saw a more dramatic de-
coupling of Medicaid and AFDC through substantial increases in the in-
come cutoﬀ for Medicaid eligibility. These expansions substantially in-
creased (in most states) the income that a family could have and still qualify
for Medicaid, while providing these higher eligibility levels to all family
structures, not just to single-parent families. By 1992, states were required
to cover all pregnant women and children under the age of six up to 133
percent of poverty (independent of family composition), and were allowed
to expand coverage up to 185 percent of poverty. In addition, children born
after 30 September 1983 were mandatorily covered up to 100 percent of
poverty (once again independent of family composition). Income for these
purposes is deﬁned similarly to the AFDC or Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families (TANF) program, including all sources of cash income.
The pattern of legislative action over this period was one of initial fed-
eral permission for states to expand their programs, followed within a
period of several years by federal mandates for all states to cover these
groups. This pattern of laws generated substantial variation across the
states in eligibility changes, since states initially had diﬀerent qualiﬁcation
limits through AFDC and other optional programs (such as Ribicoﬀ chil-
dren), and they took up the new options at diﬀerent rates. There was also
variation within states in the eligibility of children of diﬀerent ages for
the Medicaid expansions, due to diﬀerent age thresholds in the laws. This
variation is illustrated in table 1.3, from Gruber and Yelowitz (1999).
This shows the age and percent of poverty cutoﬀs for expansions to the
youngest group of children in each state at three diﬀerent points in time.2
In January 1988, only some states had expanded eligibility, and the income
and age cutoﬀs varied. By December 1989, all states had some expansion
in place since federal law mandated coverage of infants up to 75 percent of
the poverty line; but some states had expanded coverage up to age seven or
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1. In 1984, only twenty-three states oﬀered the Ribicoﬀ program; by 1987, this had ex-
panded to thirty-two states, although some states limited eligibility to somewhat younger chil-
dren (less than age seventeen, eighteen, or nineteen, instead of the traditional cutoﬀ of age
twenty-one).
2. There were also diﬀerential expansions to older children as well, adding further richness
to the variation in legislation across the states. The age restrictions were couched in terms of
either date of birth or calendar date, or both, giving rise to the fractional ages of eligibility in
some states at a given point in time.Medicaid 21
Table 1.3 State Medicaid Age and Income Eligibility Thresholds for Children
January 1988 December 1989 December 1991 December 1993
State Age Medicaid Age Medicaid Age Medicaid Age Medicaid
Alabama 1 185 8 133 10 133
Alaska 2 100 8 133 10 133
Arizona 1 100 2 100 8 140 12 140
Arkansas 2 75 7 100 8 185 10 133
California 5 185 8 185 10 200
Colorado 1 75 8 133 10 133
Connecticut 0.5 100 2.5 185 8 185 10 185
Delaware 0.5 100 2.5 100 8 160 18 185
District of Columbia 1 100 2 100 8 185 10 185
Florida 1.5 100 5 100 8 150 10 185
Georgia 0.5 100 3 100 8 133 18 185
Hawaii 4 100 8 185 10 185
Idaho 1 75 8 133 10 133
Illinois 1 100 8 133 10 133
Indiana 3 100 8 150 10 150
Iowa 0.5 100 5.5 185 8 185 10 185
Kansas 5 150 8 150 10 150
Kentucky 1.5 100 2 125 8 185 10 185
Louisiana 6 100 8 133 10 133
Maine 5 185 8 185 18 185
Maryland 0.5 100 6 185 8 185 10 185
Massachusetts 0.5 100 5 185 8 185 10 200
Michigan 1 100 3 185 8 185 10 185
Minnesota 6 185 8 185 18 275
Mississippi 1.5 100 5 185 8 185 10 185
Missouri 0.5 100 3 100 8 133 18 185
Montana 1 100 8 133 10 133
Nebraska 5 100 8 133 10 133
Nevada 1 75 8 133 10 133
New Hampshire 1 75 8 133 10 170
New Jersey 1 100 2 100 8 185 10 300
New Mexico 1 100 3 100 8 185 10 185
New York 1 185 8 185 12 185
North Carolina 1.5 100 7 100 8 185 10 185
North Dakota 1 75 8 133 10 133
Ohio 1 100 8 133 10 133
Oklahoma 1 100 3 100 8 133 10 150
Oregon 1.5 85 3 100 8 133 10 133
Pennsylvania 1.5 100 6 100 8 133 10 185
Rhode Island 1.5 100 6 185 8 185 10 185
South Carolina 1.5 100 6 185 8 185 10 185
South Dakota 1 100 8 133 10 133
Tennessee 1.5 100 6 100 8 185 10 185
Texas 3 130 8 185 10 185
Utah 1 100 8 133 10 133
Vermont 1.5 100 6 225 8 225 17 225
(continued)eight, and coverage ranged as high as 185 percent of the poverty line. By
December 1991, state policies were more uniform because the most re-
strictive federal mandates had taken place, but some variation in poverty
cutoﬀs remained. In the subsequent years, several states expanded the age
limits even further, using state-only funds.
Most states continue to base eligibility, even for expansion populations,
on the income deﬁnitions used for cash welfare programs, formerly known
as AFDC and currently as TANF. In order to qualify for welfare, a family
must pass three tests: Their gross income must be below a multiple of the
state’s needs standard (this test was applied from 1982 onward only);3 their
gross income less certain disregards for work expenses and child care must
be below the state’s needs standard; and their gross income less certain dis-
regards less a portion of their earnings must be below the state’s payment
standard. The precise structure of these rules is described in the appendix
to Currie and Gruber (1994). States are also mandated to extend Medicaid
coverage for an additional twelve months to those families whose income
rises above TANF cutoﬀs, although states can impose premiums or other
restrictions after six months.
Although these broad rules describe eligibility, there is some state dis-
cretion, and increasingly so since the mid-1990s through state waivers to
AFDC, and then through the decentralization of welfare with the transi-
tion to the TANF program. The current panoply of rules is described in
more detail in Ku, Ullman, and Almeida (1999). It is worth noting that,
even if states tighten eligibility for cash assistance using their new discre-
tion under TANF, states are required to continue to provide Medicaid to
those who meet the AFDC criteria for eligibility in place in July 1996 (al-
though the enforceability of this requirement is unclear). Categorical eligi-
bility for AFDC/TANF and the expansions for pregnant women and chil-
22 Jonathan Gruber
Table 1.3 (continued)
January 1988 December 1989 December 1991 December 1993
State Age Medicaid Age Medicaid Age Medicaid Age Medicaid
Virginia 1 100 8 133 18 133
Washington 1.5 100 8 185 8 185 18 185
West Virginia 0.5 100 6 150 8 150 18 150
Wisconsin 1 130 8 155 10 155
Wyoming 1 100 8 133 10 133
Sources: Yelowitz (1995) and Intergovernmental Health Policy Project (various editions).
Notes: The age limit represents the oldest that a child could be (at a given point in time) and still be eli-
gible. Medicaid column represents the Medicaid income limit for an infant (the maximum for an older
child is less).
3. From 1982 to 1984, this multiple was 1.5; from 1985 onward, the multiple was 1.85.dren provide the vast majority of eligibility for Medicaid for those who are
not elderly or disabled; there are a few other minor optional state programs
described in YB.
Traditionally, eligibility for AFDC (and hence Medicaid) was condi-
tioned on asset holdings of less than $1,000 per family. As part of the leg-
islation that allowed states to expand their income cutoﬀs for Medicaid el-
igibility, the federal government also authorized states to remove their
asset tests for determining eligibility. States were quick to drop asset test-
ing once they had the chance, so that by the middle of 1989 fewer than ten
states still had asset tests.
1.1.3 Eligibility for the Elderly and Disabled
For the elderly and disabled, there are four primary routes to Medicaid
eligibility. The ﬁrst is through the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) pro-
gram. The SSI program is a purely means-tested transfer program to the
elderly with countable income (which excludes income elements such as the
ﬁrst $20 of Social Security payments per month) below a certain threshold
($545 for an individual and $817 for a couple, in 2002), and with countable
assets (which exclude the value of the home, automobiles, and substantial
personal eﬀects) below $2,000 for an individual and $3,000 for a couple.
States are generally required to make all those elderly who qualify for SSI
eligible for Medicaid, unless they had more restrictive rules in place for el-
igibility before 1972; in that case, they can apply these more restrictive rules
rather than the federal SSI cutoﬀs. States can also extend eligibility to
somewhat higher-income groups if they make supplemental payments un-
der their state SSI programs.
The second route to eligibility for the elderly is the Medically Needy pro-
gram, which is designed to cover individuals who meet the family structure
requirements for welfare and whose gross resources are above welfare lev-
els, but whose high medical expenditures bring their net resources below
some certain minimal level. States who take up this option may establish
Medically Needy thresholds that are no more than 133 percent of the
state’s needs standard; states may also include asset limits that are no more
restrictive than those used for cash welfare (generally the asset limit for SSI
is used). Individuals can then “spend down” to these thresholds by sub-
tracting their medical expenditures from their gross income; if they do,
Medicaid will pay the remainder of their expenditures.4 Currently, thirty-
ﬁve states have a Medically Needy program (GB). Although this option is
available to all populations, it is used rarely by the nonelderly and nondis-
abled, but very frequently by the elderly, for whom the large costs of nurs-
ing home care can easily cause low countable incomes.
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4. The time frame over which such spend-down occurs varies across the states. See Norton
(1995, 2000) for a richer discussion of spend-down rules.A third route to eligibility is the “300 percent rule”, which allows states
to cover those who have low assets and income that does not exceed 300
percent of the SSI payment level. In states for which this is the only route
to Medicaid coverage of nursing home costs (seventeen states as of 1993,
according to YB), this means that if income exceeds this limit, these costs
are not covered regardless of their level.
A fourth route to eligibility for home- and community-based services
(HCBS; as opposed to institutionally provided care) is through the rapidly
growing number of state waivers in this area. As described in detail for each
state at www.hcfa.gov/medicaid/hpg4.htm, these waivers provide mecha-
nisms for states to experiment with alternatives to institutional care, in an
eﬀort to reduce spending on caring for the elderly and disabled. There are
seven explicit services that may be provided in HCBS waiver programs
(case management, homemaker/home health aide services, personal care
services, adult day health, habilitation, and respite care), and other ser-
vices may be requested by states (such as nonmedical transportation, in-
home support services, special communication services, minor home mod-
iﬁcations, and adult day care). To receive approval to implement HCBS
waiver programs, state Medicaid agencies must assure the Health Care Fi-
nancing Administration (HCFA) that, on an average per capita basis, the
cost of providing home- and community-based services will not exceed the
cost of care for the identical population in an institution; but to date there
is little evaluation of the net impact of these waivers on either noninstitu-
tional or (more relevantly) total program costs. There are currently 240
such waivers in eﬀect, with all states having at least one.
For all of these routes, for the elderly, there are complicated rules corre-
sponding to the treatment of income at the point of application versus on-
going enrollment. In particular, since 1988, there has been a detailed set of
rules in place to protect against spousal impoverishment for those elderly
who have a spouse remaining in the community. These rules, which are de-
scribed in detail in YB, essentially allow those with spouses in the commu-
nity to disregard substantial sums of income in considering eligibility for
Medicaid.
For the disabled, an additional element is that Medicaid coverage has
been extended to those who work their way oﬀ the SSI rolls. This coverage
is available for a limited period of time and up to a limited income level.
Finally, there is an additional category of partial Medicaid eligibility for
other groups of elderly and the disabled. The Qualiﬁed Medicare Beneﬁ-
ciary (QMB, or “quimbee”) program provides that for those aged and dis-
abled persons who are receiving Medicare whose incomes are below the
federal poverty level, and whose assets do not exceed twice the allowable
amount under SSI, states must pay Medicare part B premiums (the pay-
ment, currently $45.50 [1999] per month, that ﬁnances part of the cost
of physician care for the elderly) and any required Medicare coinsurance
24 Jonathan Gruberand deductible amounts. The Speciﬁed Low-Income Medicare Beneﬁcia-
ries (SLMB, or “slimbees”) program mandates payment of part B premi-
ums only for those elderly/disabled with incomes between 100 and 135 per-
cent of the poverty line, and a portion of these premiums for those between
135 and 175 percent of the poverty line. Expansions to this program were
phased in along with the expansions to younger populations in the late
1980s and early 1990s, as described in more detail by Yelowitz (2000a).
Other groups of former disability recipients are also entitled to Medicaid
payment of their Medicare costs; see GB and YB for more details.
A group of particular interest, particularly in the wake of the 1996 wel-
fare reform legislation, is legal immigrants. Current law stipulates that le-
gal immigrants arriving in the United States after 22 August 1996 are inel-
igible for Medicaid beneﬁts for ﬁve years; after that period, coverage is a
state option. Coverage is mandated for those arriving earlier than that date
who became disabled since arriving.
1.1.4 Services
Although states have substantial leeway along the two other key dimen-
sions of Medicaid policy, eligibility and reimbursement, they have much
less discretion when it comes to covered services, at least traditionally. All
categorically needy (as opposed to medically needy) enrollees are manda-
torily entitled to
• inpatient hospital services
• outpatient hospital services
• rural health clinic services
• federally qualiﬁed health center services
• other laboratory and X-ray services
• nursing facility services for individuals twenty-one or older
• EPSDT services for individuals under age twenty-one
• family planning services
• physicians’ services
• home health services for any individual entitled to nursing facility
(NF) care
• nurse-midwife services
• services of certiﬁed nurse practitioners and certiﬁed family nurse prac-
titioners
States do have the option of providing a more restrictive package of bene-
ﬁts to the medically needy, with the minimum standards including only
prenatal and delivery services for pregnant women; ambulatory services
for individuals under age eighteen and those entitled to institutional ser-
vices; home health services for individuals entitled to NF services; and, if
the state covers the mentally disabled in intermediate care facilities (ICFs),
they must cover all the services provided to the categorically eligible.
Medicaid 25There is also a wide range of optional services, although they in general
do not amount to a very large share of total medical spending. The most
important of these (in terms of total program costs) are prescription drugs,
which are covered in every state, although a minority of states cover them
only for the categorically needy and not the medically needy (YB). Other
services covered by all or virtually all states include clinic services, op-
tometrists’ services and eyeglasses, dental services, prosthetic devices, eye-
glasses, nursing facility services for those under age twenty-one, interme-
diate care facility/mentally retarded services, and transportation services.
Although there is a long list of optional services, the fact that the most ex-
pensive ones are covered by virtually every state implies that there is sub-
stantial uniformity of the package of services covered from state to state.
There is some state leeway on services through utilization controls and
service limitations. States can impose limits on length of inpatient hospital
stay, on the number of visits to various sites of outpatient care, and on the
number of prescriptions and quantity of drugs per prescription, and many
states take advantage of these limitations (although with fairly high limits
that are likely to be infrequently binding). States also have some limited
discretion to impose cost sharing on enrollees, with some major excep-
tions: those under age eighteen, services related to pregnancy; hospital,
NF, and ICF services if the individual is required to spend all his or her in-
come (aside from a personal needs allowance) on the service; emergency,
family planning, or hospice services; and those enrolled in health mainte-
nance organizations (HMOs). These cost-sharing amounts are nominal,
however.
1.1.5 Reimbursement
States do have substantial discretion along the third major dimension of
Medicaid policy-making, provider reimbursement. States have always had
discretion in setting physician reimbursement. Before 1980, however, states
were required to use Medicare rules for reimbursing hospitals and nursing
facilities. The Boren amendment of 1980 allowed states to move to their
own methodologies for reimbursing these providers, so long as rates were
“reasonable and adequate.” In the wake of a long history of lawsuits
brought under the Boren amendment that reimbursement rates were not
reasonable, the amendment was repealed as part of the Balanced Budget
Act of 1997, which mandated only that states must provide public notice of
their proposed rates for reimbursing hospitals, nursing facilities, and ICFs
and the methods used to establish those rates.
For hospitals, almost all states used the freedom conferred on them by
the Boren amendment to move away from traditional retrospective, cost-
based reimbursement (a move made by the Medicare program itself under
the Prospective Payment System implemented in 1983). Most states moved
to a purely prospective system of rates that either pay a ﬁxed amount per
26 Jonathan Gruberday or pay for the entire stay for a given diagnosis, while some states use a
hybrid of retrospective and prospective reimbursement. Some states also
negotiate rates with hospitals through a bidding process, whereby the
states restrict enrollees’ choice of hospital and negotiate with hospitals for
the right to provide services to Medicaid enrollees. In 1990, the American
Hospital Association estimated that, on average, Medicaid reimburses
hospitals for roughly 80 percent of their costs (YB).
Another important component of hospital reimbursement policy is Dis-
proportionate Share payments (DSH). The Omnibus Budget Reconcilia-
tion Act (OBRA) of 1981 mandated that states Medicaid reimbursement
systems “take into account the situation of hospitals which serve a dispro-
portionate number of low-income patients with special needs.” This deﬁni-
tion was state-determined until 1988, and then federally mandated as re-
lating to a hospital’s load of both Medicaid and other low-income patients.
As discussed in more detail presently, this program provided a loophole
that allowed states to eﬀectively increase the federal share of ﬁnancing of
hospital payments, and starting in 1992 state DSH payments were capped.
Nursing facility reimbursement is also done on a largely prospective ba-
sis, usually using per diem rates; once again, states have substantial discre-
tion here, and there are wide variations in reimbursement rates. Some
states also adjust payments for the case mix of patients residing in the fa-
cility. Medicaid reimbursement rates appear to be roughly 80 percent as
generous as those of the private sector (YB). For an excellent review of
Medicaid policy and other issues in long-term care, see Norton (2000).
Physician reimbursement is also largely determined by the states, and, as
a rule, reimbursement is fairly low relative to private plans and to Medicare.
States generally use a fee schedule, whereby physicians are reimbursed for
their charges up to a set amount, based on diagnosis and treatment. Fees
vary enormously for individual services, as well as (although to a lesser ex-
tent) for the overall package of services: In 1989, the range of fees across
states for an oﬃce visit was from $10 to $104, and for total obstetric care
with a vaginal delivery the range was from $344 to $1,316; the range for the
value of the total package of services was a factor of 3.3 (YB). The average
state pays roughly 70 percent of what is paid under the Medicare program
for comparable treatments. The gap with private payers is even larger; for
vaginal childbirth, for example, Medicaid paid 43 percent of the amount
paid by private payers, and the increment for cesarean delivery was only 23
percent as large (Gruber, Kim, and Mayzlin 1998).
The method of reimbursing the other primary source of ambulatory
care, hospital outpatient departments, is varied as well, with most states
using prospective systems but with a larger component of retrospective
cost-based reimbursement than is used on the inpatient side. Importantly,
all providers are required to accept Medicaid payment rates as payments in
full, except where the nominal cost-sharing noted above is allowed.
Medicaid 27Finally, an important and complicated area of Medicaid reimbursement
policy is for prescription drugs. As described in Scott-Morton (1997),
under OBRA 1990 the Medicaid program established a “most-favored-
nation” provision under which pharmaceutical producers could charge
Medicaid no more than they charged to other payers. As predicted by the-
ory, this led to a rise in pharmaceutical prices by weakening the incentives
for price competition. Other speciﬁc details of Medicaid state reimburse-
ment policy for drugs are provided in YB.
States are also entitled to “buy into” private coverage for Medicaid when
it is cost-eﬀective to do so. This situation might arise, for example, if a per-
son eligible for Medicaid is provided group health insurance; Medicaid
could in principle pay the employee’s share of the group premiums in that
case, lowering costs below the total cost of Medicaid coverage.
1.1.6 Waiver Options/Managed Care
An area of growing importance for state Medicaid policy is that of
waiver options, which allow states to experiment in limited ways outside of
the structure provided by federal guidelines. Since the early stages of Med-
icaid, states have been allowed to enroll their caseload in managed care or-
ganizations such as HMOs. OBRA 1981 established two new options,
“freedom of choice” and “home- and community-based care” waivers.
Thef ormer allows states to place some restrictions on the provider choice
set for enrollees, such as using primary care case management programs
through which enrollees must see a gatekeeper physician before seeking
specialty services, or using selective contracting of the type noted above
with hospitals. The latter option allows states to innovate with alternatives
to institutionally based care; originally, these innovations had to be
demonstrated to be cost-neutral, but since OBRA 1990 there are limited
funds available for waivers that increase costs. Of course, projections of
cost neutrality are tenuous at best, and to date there is little retrospective
evidence on the actual cost eﬃcacy of these alternatives.
The past decade has seen an explosion in state use of managed care as a
means of controlling Medicaid program costs. Between 1993 and 2001, en-
rollment in Medicaid managed care increased by over 450 percent, and by
2001, 58 percent of Medicaid beneﬁciaries were enrolled in some form of
managed care. Medicaid managed care programs generally fall into two
categories: those where the health plan assumes full ﬁnancial risk for the
services that it provides to enrollees (“risk-based” programs), and those
where an individual health provider is paid a monthly amount by the state
for managing health care services (the gatekeeper approach previously
noted). The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 further increased use of man-
aged care by removing the requirement of a federal waiver for enrolling the
majority of Medicare beneﬁciaries in managed care, allowing states to con-
tract with “Medicaid only” HMOs, and allowing states to lock beneﬁciar-
ies in the same plan for up to twelve months (GB).
28 Jonathan GruberDespite its phenomenal growth, there has been relatively little work on
managed care in Medicare. Currie and Fahr (2000) nicely review the liter-
ature in this area. There are conjectures that the impacts of managed care
on health might be positive (through increased gatekeeping and facilita-
tion of primary care) or negative (through supply limits on care), but there
is little evidence to support either view. The best work here is probably
Levinson and Ullman’s (1998) study of managed care on birth outcomes in
Wisconsin. They found that enrollment in managed care by Medicaid
mothers was associated with increased use of prenatal care but no changes
in birth outcomes. A more general ﬁnding of past work is that Medicaid
managed care organizations (MCOs) select on health in their enrollment
decisions. Consistent with this, Currie and Fahr ﬁnd that areas with higher
managed care penetration have higher enrollment of low-cost groups
(whites and older children) and lower penetration of high-cost groups
(blacks and younger children). The impact of managed care on the Medic-
aid program is clearly an area deserving of further work.
1.1.7 Administration and Financing
The Medicaid program is administered by state agencies under the gen-
eral oversight of the HCFA, Department of Health and Human Services
(DHHS). Within HCFA, Medicaid operations have been centered since
1990 in a separate Medicaid Bureau. States must designate a single admin-
istrative agency for program operations. This can be either the welfare or
social services department, the health department, a combination health/
social services department, or a separate entity that is Medicaid-speciﬁc.
A key component of Medicaid enrollment is the application process for
determining eligibility. Medicaid applications can be lengthy and cumber-
some. As a result, a number of states have established streamlined applica-
tion processes for pregnant women and children, along several dimensions.
The most important is “presumptive eligibility,” which allows potential en-
rollees to receive services after an interim determination by providers that
the woman or child is eligible. States have also shortened applications,
expedited eligibility processes, and outstationed case workers in health
care sites to ease the application process. By early 1998, forty states had
dropped asset tests for eligibility, forty-four had shortened application
forms, and twenty-seven had presumptive eligibility for pregnant women
(National Governors Association [NGA] 1998).
Medicaid also has a signiﬁcant quality control component that is de-
scribed in great detail in YB. There are also detailed certiﬁcation processes
for providers, particularly for nursing homes, to ensure quality care, as de-
scribed in YB.
Medicaid services and associated administrative costs are jointly ﬁ-
nanced by the federal government and the states. The federal share of state
payments for services is an uncapped entitlement that is determined
through the federal medical assistance percentage (FMAP), which is cal-
Medicaid 29culated annually based on a formula designed to provide a higher percent-
age of federal matching payments to states with lower per capita incomes.
On average, the federal government pays roughly 57 percent of the costs of
the Medicaid program, with the percentage varying between 50 and 83 per-
cent across states. One source of controversy is whether state per capita
income is the right measure of state need in determining the federal cost
share; in a series of studies, the Government Accounting Oﬃce (GAO)
concluded that a measure based on state property values and the share of
the population in poverty would better capture both need and the state’s
own ability to ﬁnance care (YB). Federal funding for Medicaid is an enti-
tlement, created by Title XIX of the Social Security Act, and so does not
require reauthorization by the Congress.
State Medicaid spending has been rising very rapidly since the late 1980s,
as is documented in more detail presently. One controversial source of this
spending increase has been provider donations or taxes to the state. Essen-
tially, states had providers of Medicaid services either pay taxes or dona-
tions to the state, and then bill the cost of these actions to the Medicaid pro-
gram by selectively raising reimbursement through DSH. Since the
donations or taxes accrue 100 percent to the state, but increased DSH costs
are borne partially by the federal government (according to the FMAP for
that state), this mechanism caused a net transfer from federal to state gov-
ernments. The exact mechanics of these schemes is described in more detail
in YB. This became a very popular source of funding for the Medicaid pro-
gram in the early 1990s, a period when the federal government was mandat-
ing expanded eligibility for pregnant women and children, and contributed
to an explosion of both DSH and overall program costs. Subsequent legis-
lation has limited the use of these mechanisms, both by directly ruling out
some types of structures and by capping the magnitude of DSH payments.
1.1.8 Children’s Health Insurance Program
The largest single expansion of insurance entitlement since the estab-
lishment of the Medicaid program was the Children’s Health Insurance
Program (CHIP) in the Balanced Budget Act of 1997. This program allows
states to extend eligibility to children with incomes above Medicaid limits,
either through further expansions of Medicaid or through newer, more
ﬂexible programs. The ultimate structure of the program represents an in-
teresting compromise between groups that advocated expansion of the ex-
isting Medicaid program and those that wanted simple lump-sum grants to
the states to spend on health care.
This program is a capped federal expenditure, amounting to $4.3 billion
in each of its ﬁrst four years, and a total of $40 billion over ten years. These
funds are allotted to states initially in proportion to their share of the low-
income uninsured population, and eventually in proportion to both this
and the total number of low-income children (so as to not penalize states
that make progress on increasing insurance coverage). The FMAP for this
30 Jonathan Gruberprogram is equal to 1.3 times the states’ FMAP for Medicaid, to entice
states to expand coverage through this option.
State beneﬁts packages under CHIP can be more limited than under
Medicaid, but they must meet (or be actuarially equivalent to) the cover-
age standards through either the Blue Cross/Blue Shield option of the Fed-
eral Employees Health Beneﬁts Program (FEHBP), a health beneﬁts plan
that is oﬀered to state employees, or the HMO plan with the largest com-
mercial enrollment in the state. States with existing “state only” programs
that expanded beyond Medicaid limits using state funds could continue to
use their existing beneﬁt packages. Cost sharing must remain nominal be-
low 150 percent of the poverty line, but above that point copayments and
premiums can amount to as much as 5 percent of family income.
This program leaves a substantial amount of discretion for the states in
how to spend their allotment, reﬂecting the compromise previously noted.
States were required to submit state plans to be reviewed by HCFA before
they could receive their initial allotments. As of 1 August 1999, all ﬁfty
states and the District of Columbia had developed plans for children’s
health insurance expansions under CHIP—and all but three had received
federal approval (Ullman, Hill, and Almeida 1999). CHIP will in principle
dramatically increase eligibility for children; the average income threshold
for children across the states will rise from 121 percent of the federal
poverty line to 206 percent. Of the ﬁfty-one CHIP plans submitted, eight-
een expand Medicaid, seventeen create programs separate from Medicaid,
and sixteen do both; ten of the states with “new” programs actually have
Medicaid look-alike programs that cap enrollment, impose expanded cost-
sharing requirements, or both (Ullman, Hill, and Almeida).
1.2 Program Statistics
1.2.1 Expenditures and Enrollment
Medicaid expenditures over time are shown in table 1.4. Expenditures in
1966 totaled $1.7 billion and by 2001 were expected to rise to over $219 bil-
lion. Program growth was fastest from 1988 through 1994, when the pro-
gram virtually tripled over a seven-year period; as previously noted, this is
a period marked by both substantial eligibility expansions and state gam-
ing of the DSH system to pay for the expansions. There has been a slight
rise in the federal share since the early years of the program; the federal
share rose from 54 percent on average in 1970 to 57 percent in 2001.
Enrollment growth has also been rapid, as shown in table 1.5. The total
number of recipients has risen from 17.6 million in 1972 to 37.9 billion in
2001. The most rapid growth has been in the disabled, and the largest ab-
solute growth has been in dependent children under age twenty-one. The
current division of spending across these groups is shown as well at the bot-
tom of table 1.5.
Medicaid 31Table 1.4 Medicaid Expenditures
Total Federal State
Fiscal %%%  
Year ($ millions) Increase ($ millions) Increase ($ millions) Increase
1966a 1,658 — 789 — 869 —
1967a 2,368 42.8 1,209 53.2 1,159 33.4
1968a 3,686 55.7 1,837 51.9 1,849 59.5
1969a 4,166 13.0 2,276 23.9 1,890 2.2
1970a 4,852 16.5 2,617 15.0 2,235 18.3
1971 6,176 27.3 4,361 29.3 4,074 45.4
1972b 8,434 36.6 4,361 29.3 4,074 45.4
1973 9,111 8.0 4,998 14.6 4,113 1.0
1974 10,229 12.3 5,833 16.7 4,396 6.9
1975 12,637 23.5 7,060 21.0 5,578 26.9
1976 14,644 15.9 8,312 17.7 6,332 13.5
TQc 4,106 n.a. 2,354 n.a. 1,752 n.a.
1977 17,103 16.8d 9,713 16.9d 7,389 16.7d
1978 18,949 10.8 10,680 10.0 8,269 11.9
1979 21,755 14.8 12,267 14.9 9,489 14.8
1980 25,781 18.5 14,550 18.6 11,231 18.4
1981 30,377 17.8 17,074 17.3 13,303 18.4
1982 32,446 6.8 17,514 2.6 14,931 12.2
1983 34,956 7.7 18,985 8.4 15,971 7.0
1984 37,568 7.5 20,061 5.7 17,508 9.6
1985e 40,917 8.9 22,655f 12.9 18,262f 4.3
1986 44,851 9.6 24,995 10.3 19,856 8.7
1987 49,344 10.0 27,435 9.8 21,909 10.3
1988 54,116 9.7 30,462 11.0 23,654 8.0
1989 61,246 13.2 34,604 13.6 26,642 12.6
1990 72,492 18.4 41,103 18.8 31,389 17.8
1991 91,519 26.2 52,532 27.8 38,987 24.2
1992 118,166 29.1 67,827 29.1 50,339 29.1
1993 131,775 11.5 75,774 11.7 56,001 11.2
1994 143,204 8.7 82,034 8.3 61,170 9.2
1995 156,395 9.2 89,070 8.6 67,325 10.1
1996 161,963 3.6 91,990 3.3 69,973 3.9
1997 167,635 3.5 95,552 3.8 72,083 3.1
1998 177,364 5.8 100,177 4.8 77,187 7.1
1999g 189,547 6.9 108,042 7.9 81,505 5.6
2000g 203,714 7.5 116,117 7.5 87,597 7.5
2001g 219,014 7.5 124,838 7.5 94,176 7.6
Source: Budget of the U.S. Government, ﬁscal years 1969–2001, and HCFA.
Notes: n.a. indicates not available. Totals may not add due to rounding.
aIncludes related programs that are not separately identiﬁed, although for each successive year a larger
portion of the total represents Medicaid expenditure. As of 1 January 1970, federal matching was only
available under Medicaid.
bIntermediate care facilities (ICFs) transferred from the cash assistance programs to Medicaid eﬀective
1 January 1972. Data for prior periods do not include these costs.
cTransitional quarter (beginning of federal ﬁscal year moved from July 1 to October 11).
dRepresents increase over ﬁscal year 1976 (i.e., ﬁve calendar quarters).
eIncludes transfer of function of state fraud control units to Medicaid from Oﬃce of Inspector General.
fTemporary reductions in federal payments authorized for ﬁscal years 1982–84 were discontinued in ﬁs-
cal year 1985.
gCurrent law estimate.In recent years, enrollment growth has slowed for nonelderly or disabled
adults and their dependents. This slowdown has been noticeable because of
the correspondence in timing with the enormous reduction in welfare case-
loads of recent years, leading to the possibility that a costly side eﬀect of
welfare reform is reduced health insurance coverage. Ku and Garrett (2000)
investigate the determinants of Medicaid caseloads over time and conclude
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Table 1.5 Unduplicated Number of Medicaid Recipients by Eligibility Category, Fiscal Years
1972–95 (in thousands)
Adults with Other
Fiscal Age Dependent Dependent Title
Year Total 65 Blindness Disabled Children Children XIXa
1972 17,606 3,318 108 1,625 7,841 3,137 1,576
1973 19,622 3,496 101 1,804 8,659 4,066 1,495
1974 21,462 3,732 135 2,222 9,478 4,392 1,502
1975 22,007 3,615 109 2,355 9,598 4,529 1,800
1976 22,815 3,612 97 2,572 9,924 4,774 1,836
1977 22,832 3,676 82 2,636 9,651 4,785 1,852
1978 21,965 3,376 82 2,636 9,376 4,643 1,852
1979 21,520 3,364 79 2,674 9,106 4,570 1,727
1980 21,605b 3,440 92 2,817 9,333 4,877 1,499
1981 21,980 3,367 86 2,993 9,581 5,187 1,364
1982 21,603 3,240 84 2,806 9,563 5,356 1,434
1983 21,554 3,371 77 2,844 9,535 5,592 1,129
1984 21,607 3,238 79 2,834 9,684 5,600 1,187
1985 21,814 3,061 80 2,937 9,757 5,518 1,214
1986 22,515 3,140 82 3,100 10,029 5,647 1,362
1987 23,109 3,224 85 3,296 10,168 5,599 1,418
1988 22,907 3,159 86 3,401 10,037 5,503 1,343
1989 23,511 3,132 95 3,496 10,318 5,717 1,175
1990 25,255 3,202 83 3,635 11,220 6,010 1,105
1991 28,280 3,359 85 3,983 13,415 6,778 658
1992 30,926 3,742 84 4,378 15,104 6,954 664
1993 33,432 3,863 84 4,932 16,285 7,505 763
1994 35,053 4,053 87 5,372 17,194 7,586 763
1995 36,282 4,119 92 5,767 17,164 7,605 1,537
1996 36,118 4,285 95 6,126 16,739 7,127 652
1997c 34,872 3,955 6,129d 15,266 6,803 524
1998 40,649 3,964 6,638 18,309 7,908 655
1999 37,500 4,700 7,000 17,500 7,600 700
Source:Health Care Financing Administration, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services; [http://
www.hcfa.gov/stats/hstats98/blusta98.htm#Table 11] and [http://www.hcfa.gov/medicaid/MCD97T09.
htm].
aThis category is composed predominantly of children not meeting the deﬁnition of “dependent” chil-
dren, that is, “Ribicoﬀ children.”
bBeginning in ﬁscal year 1980, recipients categories do not add to the unduplicated total due to the small
number of recipients that are in more than category during the year.
cFiscal year 1977 began in October 1976 and was the ﬁrst year of the new federal ﬁscal cycle. Before 1977,
the ﬁscal year began in July.
dFor ﬁscal years 1997–99, blind and disabled categories are combined.that the recent declines are primarily attributable to both the improved
economy and welfare reforms. Garrett and Holahan (2000) show that many
welfare leavers lose their Medicaid coverage despite laws that allow them to
extend Medicaid for one year after exiting welfare. In particular, they ﬁnd
that, among children whose families have been oﬀ welfare for six months,
only one-ﬁfth are uninsured. Of the children whose families have been oﬀ
welfare for a year or more, however, almost one-third are uninsured.
Table 1.6 shows the division of Medicaid program spending by enroll-
ment category, in 1998 and over time. Spending rose most rapidly for the
blind and disabled, and least rapidly for adults. In recent years, spending
growth has also been particularly rapid for children.
Table 1.7 shows the division of Medicaid program spending by service
category, in 1997 and over time. Roughly one-ﬁfth of program spending is
on inpatient hospital expenses, and roughly another quarter is on skilled
nursing facilities. Another 8 percent is on intermediate care facilities for
the mentally retarded. Only 6 percent of program spending is on physi-
cians’ services, and another 5 percent is spent on other ambulatory care de-
livered in hospital outpatient departments and in clinics. The other major
categories of spending are home health care and prescription drugs, each
with 10 percent of program spending.
In terms of spending growth, the most rapidly growing categories since
1975 have been outpatient hospital expenses and home health expenses. In
the 1990s in particular, home health, skilled nursing facility, and prescribed
drug expenditures have grown the most rapidly, while hospital inpatient ex-
penditures have been kept relatively in check, perhaps due to increasing
use of prospective reimbursement strategies.
1.2.2 Eligibility and Takeup
A key issue with all social insurance programs is limited takeup among
those eligible, and Medicaid is no exception, an issue discussed at length
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Table 1.6 Medicaid Payments by Eligibility Category, Fiscal Years 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990,
1995, and 1998 (in billions of constant 1998 dollars)
Age 65 Blind or
and Older Disabled Children Adults Other Total
1975 13.7 9.9 6.9 6.5 1.5 38.4
1980 17.7 15.4 6.3 6.6 1.2 47.3
1985 21.4 20.4 6.7 7.2 1.2 57.0
1990 27.1 30.7 11.5 10.8 1.3 81.7
1995 39.1 52.9 19.2 14.5 1.6 128.6
1998 40.6 60.4 20.5 14.8 6.0 142.3
Average annual % 
change 1975–98 5.1 8.6 5.1 3.8 6.4 6.1










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.presently. Eligibility, as described above, is determined through a compli-
cated set of screens on income, family structure, and in some cases assets.
In a series of papers with Janet Currie and Aaron Yelowitz, I have devel-
oped an eligibility calculator for children and pregnant women for the
Medicaid program based on data from the Current Population Survey
(CPS). This program has been recently updated to 1996 and improved for
children in Dafny and Gruber (2000).5
Figure 1.1graphs our estimates of national eligibility, and Medicaid cov-
erage rates, for children aged zero to ﬁfteen; these data are from the CPS as
well. Take-up is close to full in the early 1980s, before the expansions of
Medicaid, but falls considerably over time as Medicaid expands.6 By 1996,
31 percent of children are eligible for Medicaid, but only 22.6 percent are
enrolled, for an average take-up rate of 73 percent. But the falling take-up
rate over time highlights the diﬀerence between average and marginal take-
up rates of expansions, which is discussed in more detail presently.
This ﬁgure masks enormous state heterogeneity in eligibility policy,
which is illustrated in table 1.8, which shows estimated eligibility by state
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5. In particular, we make two major limitations to eligibility relative to the approach used
in the model previously. First, we do not assume that children can avail themselves of the med-
ically needy option, since this requires extensive medical spending over several consecutive
months and is unlikely to be a realistic consideration for the typical child. Second, we incor-
porate in only a limited way the child care deduction for earned income, reﬂecting the limited
take-up of this deduction in practice.
6. The large jump in coverage in 1987 is due to a CPS redesign in March 1988 (which col-
lected the coverage data for 1987).
Fig. 1.1 Eligibility and coverage of children 0–15Table 1.8 Estimated Eligibility by State (average among children up to age ﬁfteen)
State 1983 Eligibility 1996 Eligibility Diﬀerence
United States 0.131 0.292 0.161
Alabama 0.084 0.284 0.200
Alaska 0.173 0.150 –0.023
Arizona 0.087 0.472 0.385
Arkansas 0.084 0.289 0.205
California 0.223 0.22 0.099
Colorado 0.076 0.192 0.116
Connecticut 0.124 0.309 0.185
Delaware 0.070 0.188 0.118
District of Columbia 0.304 0.473 0.169
Florida 0.102 0.323 0.221
Georgia 0.095 0.287 0.192
Hawaii 0.213 0.672 0.459
Idaho 0.0455 0.225 0.1795
Illinois 0.148 0.231 0.083
Indiana 0.090 0.153 0.063
Iowa 0.161 0.200 0.039
Kansas 0.073 0.228 0.155
Kentucky 0.103 0.346 0.243
Louisiana 0.087 0.345 0.258
Maine 0.134 0.267 0.133
Maryland 0.104 0.318 0.214
Massachusetts 0.109 0.214 0.105
Michigan 0.226 0.304 0.078
Minnesota 0.107 0.514 0.407
Mississippi 0.113 0.319 0.206
Missouri 0.123 0.232 0.109
Montana 0.045 0.338 0.293
Nebraska 0.051 0.225 0.174
Nevada 0.043 0.157 0.114
New Hampshire 0.037 0.267 0.23
New Jersey 0.135 0.221 0.086
New Mexico 0.060 0.589 0.529
New York 0.204 0.321 0.117
North Carolina 0.054 0.243 0.189
North Dakota 0.097 0.148 0.051
Ohio 0.129 0.220 0.091
Oklahoma 0.115 0.305 0.190
Oregon 0.101 0.298 0.197
Pennsylvania 0.164 0.314 0.150
Rhode Island 0.149 0.209 0.060
South Carolina 0.131 0.251 0.120
South Dakota 0.054 0.212 0.158
Tennessee 0.112 0.266 0.154
Texas 0.063 0.283 0.220
Utah 0.168 0.178 0.010
Vermont 0.183 0.458 0.275
Virginia 0.083 0.256 0.173
Washington 0.058 0.434 0.376
West Virginia 0.120 0.494 0.374
Wisconsin 0.146 0.210 0.064
Wyoming 0.023 0.202 0.179for 1983 and 1996, on average among children aged zero to ﬁfteen. Eligi-
bility varied substantially across the states in both 1983 and 1996, and
there were quite diﬀerential changes in eligibility across states as well. For
example, over this period, eligibility rose by over 50 percent in New Mex-
ico, by 45 percent in Hawaii, and by 39 percent in Arizona; but eligibility
rose by only 1 percent in Utah and 6 percent in Rhode Island, and actually
fell by 2.3 percent in Alaska.
Unfortunately, there are no estimates of eligibility for Medicaid and
take-up of the program by the elderly and disabled. These would be com-
plicated dynamic calculations, because many elderly or disabled who are
not currently eligible could become so by spending down enough of their
resources to qualify.
1.3 Review of Issues
1.3.1 How Does Public Health Insurance Aﬀect Health?7
Ultimately, the question of most interest for analysis of the Medicaid
program is how it aﬀects the health of the target population, and at what
cost. To understand the eﬀects of Medicaid policy on health, however, it is
important to trace through the channels by which these legislative rules are
translated to actual health improvements. In this section I provide a brief
overview of these channels through a general structure that applies to all
elements of the Medicaid program. In the next section, I review what we
know about each of them, within the context of each of the diﬀerent func-
tions of the Medicaid program.
The process by which Medicaid determines health is depicted in ﬁgure
1.2. The ﬁrst step in evaluating the eﬀect of Medicaid policy on outcomes
of interest, such as health, is to examine the eﬀects on the eligibility of per-
sons for the Medicaid program. How rules get translated to actual eligible
populations is a function of where the eligibility levels cut in the distribu-
tion of income and other characteristics such as family structure. Deter-
mining population eligibility is particularly diﬃcult for the disabled, since
disability is a somewhat ambiguous concept in this context.
The next step is the translation of Medicaid eligibility into Medicaid
coverage. An important feature of social insurance programs is that indi-
viduals do not always take up the beneﬁts for which they are eligible. For
example, Blank and Card (1991) estimate that take-up of unemployment
insurance beneﬁts only about two-thirds, and Blank and Ruggles (1996)
ﬁnd similar take-up rates for the AFDC and Food Stamps programs. Thus,
only some of the previously uninsured will take-up the beneﬁts to which
they are entitled.
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7. This discussion parallels and draws extensively on Gruber (1997).The previously uninsured are not the only group that takes up beneﬁts,
however. In fact, the majority of those made eligible for the expansions ac-
tually had private insurance already. Some of those individuals will ﬁnd it
attractive to drop that private insurance and join the Medicaid program,
“crowding out” their private insurance coverage.
Moreover, once covered by Medicaid, individuals will not automatically
increase their utilization of medical care. Many physicians do not treat
publicly insured patients, possibly because public insurance programs
generally reimburse at rates far below private fee levels. A number of ob-
servers have alleged that there is a shortfall in the supply of physicians
willing to serve Medicaid patients. The American Medical Association
(AMA; 1991) reports that 26 percent of physicians described themselves
as “non-participants” in the Medicaid program, and only 34 percent re-
ported that they participated “fully” and were accepting new Medicaid pa-
tients. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that many of the patients
who would be made eligible for public insurance are concentrated in areas
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Fig. 1.2 How Medicaid determines healththat are underserved by physicians (Fossett and Peterson 1989; Fossett et
al. 1992).8
Finally, increases in the utilization of care will not necessarily improve
health. Many economists emphasize that medical care may actually be of
limited relevance for health, relative to the other behavioral and environ-
mental factors aﬀecting the health of low-income persons. A number of
studies suggest that much of the medical care provided to both adults and
children is inappropriate and may have little health beneﬁt. There is a large
literature that suggests that insured persons are in better health than the
uninsured, but this literature has generally failed to fully surmount the
problem of omitted joint determinants of insurance and health status.
Clever studies that use exogenous variation in insurance coverage or med-
ical access (Lurie et al. 1984; Bindman et al. 1991) document positive
eﬀects of insurance on adult health, but a randomized trial (Newhouse
1993) suggested that increasing the generosity of insurance coverage had
little health beneﬁt.
Whether or not increases in utilization improve health outcomes, there
is a deﬁnite link between increased utilization and increases in Medicaid
program costs. Thus, the ﬁnal step in assessing the eﬃcacy of Medicaid
policy is to compare the costs of utilization increases to any health bene-
ﬁts, to compute the cost-eﬀectiveness of the program.
1.3.2 Take-up and Crowdout
Given the importance of translating Medicaid eligibility into participa-
tion, it is worth reviewing in some more detail the mechanics of this step.
The economics of program participation among the existing uninsured
parallels a number of analyses of take-up of programs such as AFDC.
Moﬃtt (1983) provides an excellent exposition of the economics of that
take-up decision. To summarize, in this model, individuals are trading oﬀ
the income gained from participation against the stigma costs of partici-
pating. They must also incorporate the high implicit taxes on working in
the range of program eligibility, so that the underlying wage rate is a key de-
terminant of participation. If the return to work is high enough, or stigma
is high enough, eligibles will not participate.
Cutler and Gruber (1996a) lay out the economics of crowdout, follow-
ing Peltzman’s (1973) seminal analysis of crowdout of private education by
public education expenditures. Consider a person or family eligible for
Medicaid, deciding on their insurance choice. For simplicity, they assume
that insurance is sold individually and that policies diﬀer only in the com-
prehensiveness of medical care that is covered. For example, more gener-
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8. For example, Fossett et al. (1992) compared Chicago neighborhoods with 50 percent of
the population on welfare to neighborhoods with 10 percent of the population on welfare and
found that there were twice as many physicians practicing in the wealthier areas (on a per
child basis).ous plans oﬀer a greater range of providers or cover a wider set of medical
services. People choose between more generous insurance and other
goods, as shown in ﬁgure 1.3. People valuing insurance highly (i.e., those
demanding the highest quality providers) will choose a policy such as D,
whereas those valuing insurance less highly will choose a point such as E.
Now the government introduces free public insurance with generosity
M. On paper, Medicaid is a very valuable policy—almost everything is
covered, and there is little or no cost sharing. For many reasons, however,
the value of Medicaid is below that of private policies. Because of low Med-
icaid reimbursement rates, providers are often reluctant to treat Medicaid
patients, thus reducing the value of coverage. In addition, individuals may
not want to be enrolled in public programs because of the stigma associ-
ated with public programs or the diﬃculty in enrolling. Finally, the value
of Medicaid may be low because individuals may have diﬃculty shifting
from Medicaid back into private coverage if they have preexisting medical
conditions. We thus show the value of the Medicaid package as below the
value of most private policies.
Individuals cannot purchase a supplement to Medicaid (for example, an
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Fig. 1.3 Choice between insurance coverage and other goodsoption to see higher-quality doctors by paying more on the margin). Thus,
individuals who choose the public sector must consume insurance of ex-
actly the amount M; if they want any higher-quality insurance, they return
to the original budget constraint. The budget constraint with Medicaid is
therefore ABMC. In response to this public coverage, people with low val-
ues of private insurance (such as E) will choose to enroll in the public sec-
tor, while individuals with a high valuation of insurance (such as D) will
choose to retain their private insurance.
The key empirical prediction of this model is readily apparent in ﬁgure
1.3: As the value of public coverage rises, relative to the underlying demand
for insurance quality, then individuals will be more likely to drop their
private insurance and enroll in Medicaid. Given the absence of informa-
tion on desired insurance coverage for individuals, most work in this area
tests a weaker prediction of this model: On average, individuals made eli-
gible for public insurance will reduce their private insurance coverage, rel-
ative to groups not eligible for public insurance. A complication to this
analysis is that most private health insurance is provided through employ-
ment, rather than being purchased individually, so that workers may not
receive the savings from forgoing employer-provided coverage. Although
empirical evidence suggests that health insurance costs are passed back to
workers (Gruber 1994; Sheiner 1994), this research has not established
whether this passback occurs in response to individual or group choices of
insurance. If individual workers do not receive the savings from choosing
not to purchase insurance, they will perceive moving to Medicaid as a re-
duction in health insurance but not as an increase in other consumption.
Fewer people will drop private insurance coverage in this case.
In the absence of complete wage shifting, employers may encourage
workers to drop coverage in other ways. One way to do this is to reduce the
generosity of the beneﬁts oﬀered, or in the limit, to simply stop oﬀering in-
surance to the workers; in either case, these limitations on the private op-
tion will make the public option relatively more attractive. Alternatively,
employers can reduce the share of the premium that they pay. When em-
ployees pay more of the premium, the link between Medicaid receipt and
additional income may be more direct (since it does not operate through
the veil of shifting to wages). In addition, because there is a tax subsidy for
employer spending on insurance but not for individual spending, increas-
ing the share of the premium that employees pay directly eﬀectively raises
the price of private insurance relative to Medicaid.
Because of IRS nondiscrimination rules, however, neither of these actions
can be used selectively for those workers eligible for public insurance. If in-
surance is oﬀered, it must be oﬀered to all full-time workers (Cutler and
Madrian 1998). As a result, all of these actions increase the total cost of in-
surance for employees that do not qualify for public coverage, since they lose
the tax subsidy for some insurance purchases, or (if employers drop cover-
age) they must purchase insurance in the more expensive individual market.
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may increase or decrease the amount of crowdout. If worker-speciﬁc shift-
ing is not possible, then crowdout may be reduced, as employees do not re-
alize the savings from moving to the public sector. If employers increase
cost sharing or reduce coverage for all workers, however, more workers
may decide to drop coverage than are immediately eligible for Medicaid.
A key issue for thinking about take-up and crowdout is the cash equiva-
lent value of Medicaid coverage. Estimating this value is a daunting chal-
lenge, and there has been little work in this area since the important study
of Smeeding (1982). He summarizes the various approaches to valuing in-
kind beneﬁts such as Medicaid and concludes that the economic value of
Medicaid beneﬁts to recipients is less than half of the market value. But
this conclusion is based on a number of assumptions about preferences for
medical care that are diﬃcult to verify empirically. There is clearly no con-
sensus at this point on the value of Medicaid to recipients in dollar terms.
1.3.3 Medicaid and Labor Supply
The impact of the Medicaid program on labor supply is also potentially
important, as is illustrated by the excellent exposition in Yelowitz (1995).
As noted earlier, a key feature of several public assistance plans is that, in
addition to cash beneﬁts, individuals qualify for Medicaid coverage of
their medical expenses. This coverage can amount to quite a valuable ben-
eﬁt, particularly since the work opportunities available to potential AFDC
and SSI participants are low-wage, low-skilled jobs without health cover-
age.9As a result, the linkage of Medicaid to public assistance participation
both encourages nonworkers to sign up for the programs and taxes work
among potential recipients. That is, there is a form of “welfare lock”: Indi-
viduals are reluctant to leave government programs because they will lose
their health insurance.
This eﬀect is illustrated in ﬁgure 1.4, from Yelowitz (1995); see also Win-
kler (1991). This ﬁgure shows the welfare receipt and work decisions of a
single woman with children, who can receive AFDC if her income is below
Hbreakeven. This woman trades oﬀutility from leisure and from consumption
of goods that is ﬁnanced from wage income or from welfare payments. The
recipient faces a constant post-tax wage w0. However, she is assumed to be
unable to obtain a job with health insurance.10
At zero income, this woman receives a certain amount of cash welfare in-
come from AFDC, as well as in-kind beneﬁts, such as food stamps and
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9. I use AFDC to summarize the eﬀects of AFDC/TANF, since all of the work cited in this
area refers to the older program.
10. Equivalently, she may be able to obtain a job with insurance, but only at a compensat-
ing diﬀerential that exactly equals her valuation of that insurance. Short, Cantor, and Mon-
heit (1988) ﬁnd that 43 percent of people who left welfare were covered by private health in-
surance. Since only those with the best opportunities leave welfare, the likelihood of ﬁnding
a job with insurance for the average welfare recipient, should he or she leave the program, is
quite low.Medicaid. As she earns labor income, her AFDC and non-Medicaid in-
kind beneﬁts are taxed away at a high marginal rate, so that her after-tax
wage is w1   (1 –  AFDC)   w0.11 Once she works more than Hbreakeven, the
hours of work where the entire welfare beneﬁt is taxed away, she loses her
AFDC eligibility and hence her Medicaid beneﬁts. This creates a domi-
nated part of the budget set, known as the “Medicaid notch.” This notch
provides a major disincentive to working her way oﬀ welfare. As Yelowitz
documents, for a mother with two children in Pennsylvania in January
1991, the woman would have to earn more than $5,000 additional dollars
oﬀ welfare to break even with her income on AFDC at point Hbreakeven. Of
course, although removing the notch (e.g., by allowing those to keep Med-
icaid if they leave the welfare rolls) will improve incentives to leave welfare,
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Fig. 1.4 “Welfare lock” eﬀect on single women with children
11. This marginal rate is 67 percent for the ﬁrst four months, and 100 percent thereafter (af-
ter a basic exemption and some deductions for work and child care expenses).this could reduce incentives for work among those with incomes slightly
above this notch, so the net eﬀect of the notch on total labor supply is un-
clear.
Reducing welfare lock through public insurance expansions can also
have additional eﬀects on labor market equilibrium, through adjustments
of private insurance coverage and wages. If there is crowdout of private in-
surance through Medicaid expansions, then public insurance expansions
will not only reduce welfare lock, but will also potentially reduce “job
lock” (insurance-induced immobility across private-sector jobs) as well.
By providing extra-workplace insurance coverage for workers or their de-
pendents, Medicaid frees up workers to move to more productive posi-
tions. In addition, there may also be eﬀects on wages and hiring, since em-
ployer insurance costs have been shifted to the government. If the costs of
insurance are not shifted to wages, then the expansions provide a subsidy
to the hiring of the low-wage workers who are likely to be eligible for the
program and who will therefore not take up costly employer-provided in-
surance.
1.3.4 Medicaid and Family Structure
Another potentially important set of impacts of the Medicaid program
for families is on family structure, along at least two dimensions. The ﬁrst
is the marriage decision, as described in Yelowitz (1998b). Traditionally, in
order to qualify for Medicaid, women had to be single mothers on the
AFDC program. Given that the potential marriage partners for many wel-
fare mothers may not have health insurance to provide for the woman and
her children, this could result in the woman’s remaining single in order to
qualify for Medicaid.
The second is for fertility, through two channels. First, Medicaid cover-
age of pregnancy may lower the ﬁnancial barriers to childbirth. Unless dis-
count rates are incredibly high, it seems unlikely that coverage for preg-
nancy could actually cause women to have more children. But Leibowitz
(1990) did ﬁnd that more generous insurance coverage in the RAND
Health Insurance Experiment led to shifts in the timing of childbirth. Sec-
ond, by covering the costs of children’s medical care, Medicaid may lower
the present discounted value costs of having a child. Of course, this anal-
ysis is complicated because the both the family’s ﬁnancial situation and the
restrictions and beneﬁts of the Medicaid program may change substan-
tially over the eighteen years that the child may be covered by Medicaid, so
it may be diﬃcult to project the actual value of the program in lowering fu-
ture medical costs.
1.3.5 Medicaid and Saving
As discussed in Gruber and Yelowitz (1999), there are three channels
through which increased Medicaid generosity might aﬀect saving and con-
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set testing. First, by reducing medical expenditure risk for eligible families,
the Medicaid program lowers their need for precautionary saving. This
will raise consumption and lower wealth holdings. This point is explicitly
demonstrated by Kotlikoﬀ (1988). He presents simulations of a life-cycle
model with uncertainty that demonstrate that asset accumulation will be
much lower in an economy with public insurance available than in one
where individuals self-insure their medical expenses through savings.
This negative eﬀect on wealth holdings may be oﬀset, however, by the
second eﬀect: Medicaid is explicitly redistributive and consequently in-
creases the resources of persons who become eligible for the program. For
those who were previously uninsured, this increase occurs through a re-
duction in their expected medical outlays. For those who had private in-
surance but chose to drop it in order to sign up for the Medicaid program,
there is a reduction in expected outlays for both out-of-pocket spending
and insurance payments. This redistributive transfer is transitory; it only
lasts as long as the family is eligible for Medicaid, on both income and
demographic grounds. Thus, to the extent that families are operating in a
forward-looking life-cycle framework, the transfer will be saved and
spread over future periods when there is higher out-of-pocket medical
spending risk, oﬀsetting the precautionary saving eﬀect. On the other
hand, to the extent that families are not perfectly forward-looking or that
they are qualifying for Medicaid because they are transitorily poor, some
of this transfer will be spent today.
The third and ﬁnal channel is one that is highlighted by Hubbard, Skin-
ner, and Zeldes (1995): asset testing. Over the entire population, asset tests
should lower savings; but this eﬀect might be expected to be small, to the
extent that a large share of the population does not consider Medicaid to
be a relevant option. Of potentially more interest is the interaction of asset
tests with eligibility. On the one hand, following the Hubbard-Skinner-
Zeldes logic, in a world with an asset test individuals who are made eligible
on income grounds but not on asset grounds may reduce their savings to
qualify for the program. In this case the presence of an asset test will exac-
erbate the savings reduction (and consumption increase) from expanding
Medicaid, since the newly eligible individuals must reduce their savings to
qualify (on top of the precautionary eﬀect discussed earlier).
On the other hand, if an asset test is in place, newly eligible individuals
with reasonably high savings may not consider this program a realistic op-
tion, so that the expansions will not aﬀect their savings. Under this model,
asset tests may mitigate the savings and consumption eﬀects of expansions,
since there is no precautionary saving eﬀect or redistributive eﬀect for
newly eligible persons who are high savers (and who consider the program
irrelevant). Finally, asset tests may have no eﬀect, in that they are not bind-
ing or diﬃcult to enforce. Thus, the net interactive eﬀect of asset tests and
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ambiguous prediction for the eﬀect of Medicaid eligibility on saving.
For the elderly, the impact of Medicaid on saving operates in a similar
way, with all three eﬀects. Here, however, we might expect the impact to be
heightened since the potential spending risk on nursing homes is so much
larger, and since even low-income elderly families can have substantial ﬁ-
nancial assets.
1.4 Evidence on Medicaid’s Impacts
There is a large empirical literature that investigates the impact of Med-
icaid on insurance coverage, health care utilization and outcomes, labor
supply, family structure, saving, and long-term care utilization and quality.
I will review each of these literatures in turn.
1.4.1 Introduction: Identiﬁcation of Medicaid Impacts
To introduce these literatures, it is worth reviewing the key issue in eval-
uating empirically the eﬀects of Medicaid on behavior: how to separate (or
identify) Medicaid’s eﬀects relative to confounding inﬂuences that might
be correlated with changes in Medicaid. Consider, for example, a simple re-
gression in a cross section of individuals of some behavior (e.g., health care
utilization) on a dummy for whether the individual is covered by Medicaid.
There are three confounding inﬂuences on a causal interpretation of the
Medicaid coeﬃcient in this type of regression. First, as highlighted earlier,
take-up of Medicaid among eligibles is an individual decision that could be
correlated with other behaviors, such as tastes for medical intervention.
For example, individuals who are in poorer health will use more medical
care and will be more likely to enroll in Medicaid. Thus, the exogenous re-
gressor here is Medicaid eligibility, not Medicaid coverage, since the latter
will produce estimates that suﬀer from selection bias.
Second, however, an individual indicator for Medicaid eligibility may it-
self lead to biased estimates, for three reasons. One is omitted variables
bias. Eligibility is a function of a variety of factors about individuals that
might also be correlated with their underlying behavior, such as income,
family structure, or age. In principle, these factors can be controlled for in
multivariate regression. But, in practice, eligibility is a complicated non-
linear function of these factors and how they interact with a state’s policy
regime, so it will be diﬃcult to fully control for their inﬂuence. Moreover,
diﬀerences in the ﬁnancial circumstances of particular places and times
(e.g., a recession in a particular state) might be correlated with both aggre-
gate eligibility and the outcome variables of interest. Another factor is en-
dogeneity: A sick child may cause lower parental income (if a parent is
forced to leave work to care for the child, for example), leading to a spuri-
ous positive correlation between Medicaid eligibility and utilization. Fi-
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tor, given the limitations of standard survey data sets (e.g., the reporting of
only annual income instead of the monthly income used by program ad-
ministrators to assess eligibility).
A solution to this second class of confounding inﬂuences is to ﬁnd an in-
strument that is correlated with individual eligibility for Medicaid but not
otherwise correlated with the outcome variables of interest. A natural in-
strument that meets these conditions is one that varies only with the leg-
islative environment in the state and year in which the individual lives. In a
series of articles on the impacts of Medicaid expansions for pregnant
women and children on utilization and health, Janet Currie and I intro-
duced an instrument to serve this purpose, which we called simulated eligi-
bility. To create this instrument, we ﬁrst select a nationalrandom sample of
children of each age and of women of childbearing age in each year. We
then assign that same sample to each state in that year and use the eligibil-
ity program described earlier to compute average state-level eligibility
measures for this sample. This measure can be thought of as a convenient
parameterization of legislative diﬀerences aﬀecting children in diﬀerent
state, year, and age groups—a natural way to summarize the generosity of
state Medicaid policy as it aﬀects each group is in terms of the eﬀect it
would have on a given, nationally representative, population.
This instrumental variables strategy addresses the econometric diﬃcul-
ties noted above. First, by using instruments that are arguably exogenous
to the dependent variable, it purges the model of endogeneity bias. Second,
by using the fraction of the nationally representative population eligible in
each woman or child’s state/year/age group, this approach abstracts from
any individual-level omitted variables correlated with both eligibility and
outcomes. Third, to the extent that the measurement error in the instru-
ment is uncorrelated with the measurement error in the individual eligibil-
ity measure, this also surmounts the measurement error problem. Finally,
by using a national random sample to construct the instrument, the in-
strument is purged of any eﬀects of state- and year-speciﬁc economic con-
ditions that might be correlated with both eligibility and utilization.
Even with this careful econometric approach, however, there is a third
major concern: legislative endogeneity. That is, the state policy parameters
themselves may be a function of the dependent variable, leading to a cor-
relation between even simulated (legislated) eligibility and outcomes. This
problem is fundamentally impossible to solve, but it can be addressed in
two ways. First, by including state and year ﬁxed eﬀects, models can con-
trol for any correlated ﬁxed diﬀerences across places or over time in leg-
islative tastes and in outcomes. Second, for the case of the children’s ex-
pansions, it is actually possible to include as well as full set of state   year
interactions, controlling for year-speciﬁc diﬀerences in tastes across states,
since the children’s expansions covered diﬀerent groups of children very
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nario is unlikely to be very problematic in the context of the Medicaid ex-
pansions in that much of the permanent variation in eligibility is coming
from federal mandates on states of diﬀering initial eligibility generosity,
rather than state-speciﬁc expansions beyond the federal mandates. As Cut-
ler and Gruber (1996a) note, 90 percent of the children and 70 percent of
the pregnant women made eligible between 1987 and 1992 qualiﬁed for
Medicaid under federally imposed minimum guidelines.
An alternative identiﬁcation strategy, pursued by Currie and Thomas
(1995), is to use ﬁxed eﬀects, examining the impact of Medicaid on medical
care for children who gain and lose coverage. This approach has the ad-
vantage of not relying on legislative exogeneity, but the disadvantage that
the changes in circumstances that lead children on and oﬀ the Medicaid
rolls may also be correlated with their health and tastes for health care uti-
lization. Interestingly, their ﬁndings mirror the instrumental variables ﬁnd-
ings discussed below.
1.4.2 Medicaid and Public Insurance Coverage
As noted earlier, take-up of Medicaid by program eligibles is much less
than full. This is not surprising, given the large literature that documents
partial take-up of other social insurance programs (e.g., Blank and Card
1991; Blank and Ruggles 1996). Indeed, the average take-up rate for Med-
icaid is comparable to the take-up rates of two-thirds found for other so-
cial insurance programs.
For thinking about the impact of expanding Medicaid, however, what is
relevant is not just the average take-up rate, but also the marginal take-up
rate among the newly eligible. In fact, take-up problems are likely to be even
larger for the Medicaid expansions, relative to other social insurance pro-
grams, due to the nature of the population that is being newly covered. This
point is highlighted in table 1.9, from Gruber (1997). This table presents
data for the 1984 population of children and women age ﬁfteen to forty-
four. I divide this population into three groups: those eligible for Medicaid
in 1984; those who were not eligible in 1984, but who would be eligible by
1992 rules; and those who would not be eligible by 1992 rules. When I proj-
ect future eligibility, I inﬂate 1984 incomes to 1992 levels using the CPI.
Table 1.9 shows two reasons why we might expect relatively low take-up
of the Medicaid expansions. First, the population covered by the expan-
sions was much less disadvantaged than was the population already eligi-
ble for Medicaid at the start of the period. Most important, they were rel-
atively unlikely to be receiving public assistance through AFDC. Limited
contacts with the social welfare system may make these persons unaware
of the beneﬁts to which they were newly entitled. Second, much of the pop-
ulation that was covered by the expansions already had insurance coverage
from other sources before being made eligible for Medicaid. Indeed, two-
Medicaid 49thirds of those made eligible for Medicaid already had private insurance
coverage. Thus, the demand for taking up Medicaid may be much lower
even when it is conditional on being aware of one’s eligibility.
In fact, previous research documents quite low take-up rates for Medic-
aid. Cutler and Gruber (1996a), for example, ﬁnd a take-up rate of only 23
percent for children; Currie and Gruber (1996a,b) estimate take-up rates
of 23 percent for children and 34 percent for women of childbearing age.
This ﬁnding suggests that there is only weak translation of the tremendous
eligibility expansions into Medicaid coverage. Of course, take-up ﬁndings
are more diﬃcult to interpret in the context of Medicaid than of other pro-
grams, since some of those who don’t take up coverage are actually simply
in good health and will take it up when they get sick. But this is still to some
extent a failure of take-up, to the extent that those families do not take their
children for well-child visits. This issue is discussed further below when
computing the extent of Medicaid crowdout.
A recent paper by Currie and Grogger (2000) explores the implications
of policies that might aﬀect take-up for use of medical care, in particular
prenatal care for pregnant women. They ﬁnd that state administrative
eﬀorts to increase the ease of enrollment in Medicaid have had little impact
on use of medical care. This suggests either than enrollment barriers are
not the cause of low take-up or that state eﬀorts to mitigate those barriers
have not been suﬃcient to date.
1.4.3 Medicaid and Crowdout
The fact that such a large share of the newly eligible population under
the Medicaid expansions had access to private insurance raises the
prospect that many of the new enrollees on the program may have been
crowded out of private insurance purchases. The crowdout of private in-
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Table 1.9 Characteristics of Medicaid Eligibles
Eligible Made Eligible between Not Eligible
Characteristic in 1984 between 1984 and 1992 in 1992
Share of population (%) 16 28 56
Demographics
Female headed (%) 63 30 13
Head is high school dropout (%) 45 25 12
Head works (%) 51 88 95
Family in poverty (%) 79 19 2
Mean family income ($) 10,276 18,517 38,263
Family receives AFDC (%) 47 5 1
Insurance coverage (%)
Private 23 69 88
Public 52 7 2
Uninsured 29 26 11surance mechanisms by public interventions has been the subject of a long
literature, but the ﬁrst paper to speciﬁcally consider the interaction of
private and public health insurance was by Cutler and Gruber (1996a).
The approach used by Cutler and Gruber is to exploit the tremendous
variation in Medicaid eligibility across states, within states over time, and
even within states at a point in time (from age notches in eligibility). They
use the CPS data and eligibility imputations previously described to esti-
mate models of the eﬀect of Medicaid eligibility on private insurance cov-
erage over the 1987–92 period. They control for state and time ﬁxed eﬀects,
thereby using only within-state changes in policy to identify the eﬀects of
Medicaid on private insurance, and they use the simulated instruments ap-
proach described above.
A key feature of their approach is the recognition that there may be
within-family spillovers in insurance coverage decisions. That is, it may be
inappropriate to model a child’s private insurance coverage as a function
of that child’s eligibility only. This is because private health insurance is
generally sold only for individuals or families, without gradations among
types of dependents. Thus, a family that wants to cover both parents but
not the children (because the children may qualify for Medicaid) may ﬁnd
it impossible to do so with only one policy. Similarly, there is often no sav-
ing from enrolling some dependents in a policy but not others. This lack of
distinction among dependents may increase or decrease the amount of
crowdout. To the extent that families value coverage of all members and
some members cannot qualify for public coverage, crowdout is likely to be
smaller than an individual-by-individual calculation would suggest. On
the other hand, if the Medicaid subsidy is large, families may drop cover-
age of all members, even those who do not qualify for public insurance di-
rectly. In either case, accounting for within-family spillovers is key.
Cutler and Gruber account for the eﬀect of Medicaid eligibility on the
family’s insurance coverage decisions by modeling each family member’s
insurance coverage as a function of the “Medicaid replacement rate”: the
share of expected family medical spending that is made eligible for Medic-
aid. The results of this exercise are summarized in table 1.10, from Cutler
and Gruber (1996a). They estimate that the Medicaid expansions brought
1.5 million children and 700,000 women onto the Medicaid rolls. At the
same time, they were responsible for 600,000 children, 800,000 women,
and 300,000 other family members dropping their private insurance cover-
age in order to take advantage of free Medicaid coverage. The greater than
100 percent crowdout for women, and the eﬀect on other family members,
is a by-product of within-family spillovers.
But the estimated increase in the Medicaid rolls is an underestimate of
the true increase in the availability of Medicaid to these populations. The
Medicaid expansions explicitly did not give continuous coverage to
women. Rather, they created a form of conditional coverage: Women are
Medicaid 51covered, but only for some expenses. As a result, women who are eligible
for Medicaid in the event of pregnancy but who report themselves to be
uninsured actually have some partial (conditional) insurance coverage. In
particular, these women will have their hospital bills for delivery covered,
since hospitals have developed detailed systems to insure that uninsured
persons who are eligible for Medicaid get signed up for the program.
In the same vein, Medicaid also provides a form of conditional coverage
for uninsured children. The fact that these children are not continuously
covered by Medicaid suggests that they are not availing themselves of the in-
surance for the purpose of their primary medical care. Once again, however,
when these children need hospital services, they may be signed up for Med-
icaid, so that they have conditional coverage for their hospital spending.
Cutler and Gruber value conditional coverage for women as the share of
average annual medical spending that is accounted for by hospital ex-
penses for pregnancy (25 percent), and for children as the share of annual
total spending that is at the hospital (44 percent). Doing so, shown in the
next set of rows in table 1.10, increases the estimated coverage increase to
3.5 million people. Accounting for conditional coverage, the bottom-line
estimate is that 50 percent of the increase in Medicaid eligibility was asso-
ciated with a reduction in private insurance coverage.
This is a sizable eﬀect, suggesting the importance of this issue for Med-
icaid policy design. Nevertheless, these results also suggest that at least half
of those enrolling in Medicaid were previously uninsured, so that there was
a large net improvement in health insurance coverage in the United States
as a result of the expansions.12
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Table 1.10 Eﬀect of Medicaid Expansions on Insurance Coverage
Change in Coverage (millions)
Type of Coverage Medicaid Private
Children 1.5 –0.6
Women 15–44 0.7 –0.8
Other adults n.a. –0.3
Total 2.2 –1.7 (–77%)
Conditional coverage of women 0.9 n.a.
Conditional coverage of children 0.4 n.a.
Total 3.5 –1.7 (–49%)
Source: Cutler and Gruber (1996a).
Notes: N.a. indicates data not available. Shows change in Medicaid and private coverage of
women and children due to the expansions. Each cell is number of persons (in millions).
12. Cutler and Gruber (1996b) estimate that in fact as much as 80 percent of the newly en-
rolled Medicaid population was previously uninsured. The diﬀerence between the 50 percent
and 80 percent ﬁgures is the population that dropped private insurance due to the expansions
but did not enroll in Medicaid (e.g., women who are waiting for pregnancy to enroll).This article has led to a fairly sizable literature on crowdout. Subsequent
papers have attempted a variety of diﬀerent approaches to identifying the
impacts of Medicaid on private insurance coverage, and have generally pro-
duced much more mixed evidence on the importance of crowdout. Dubay
and Kenney (1997) used an alternative strategy of examining how the cov-
erage of low-income women and children changed over time, relative to
control groups such as single men. They estimate much smaller crowdout
eﬀects. However, this approach to controlling for omitted time series im-
poses the assumption that there is no other reason why private coverage
might be independently falling more for single men than these other groups,
such as group-speciﬁc impacts of the early 1990s recession. This seems a
much stronger restriction than Cutler and Gruber’s implicit restriction that
within-state changes in policy are not correlated with within-state changes
in underlying insurance coverage. Three other articles that use a similar
identiﬁcation strategy to Cutler and Gruber (Rask and Rask 2000; Currie
1996; and Shore-Sheppard, 1999) also ﬁnd large crowdout eﬀects.
Another criticism of the Cutler and Gruber approach has been that
crowdout is fundamentally a longitudinal phenomenon, yet Cutler and
Gruber use repeated cross-sections to assess its presence. Several recent ar-
ticles use longitudinal data to assess crowdout, looking at the private
insurance coverage of the same children before and after they become
Medicaid eligible by legislation (Yazici and Kaestner, 1998; Thorpe and
Florence 1999; Blumberg, Dubay, and Norton 2000). These articles ﬁnd
little evidence of crowdout. This alternative approach also has its limita-
tions: The samples used are often much smaller than with repeated cross
sections, leading to much less precision (and the resultant inability to rule
out large crowdout eﬀects); these studies do not consider the impact of
within-family spillovers, which Cutler and Gruber found to be important;
and they consider only the short-run impacts of becoming eligible, whereas
repeated cross sections assess the steady-state eﬀects. Nevertheless, these
longitudinal studies pose a fundamental challenge to the notion of very
large crowdout eﬀects and suggest the value of further work in this area,
particularly with large longitudinal samples.
There are also a variety of questions about the mechanisms of crowdout
that are yet to be addressed by the literature. For example, does crowdout
result from ﬁrms’ deciding not to oﬀer insurance, or from workers’ opting
not to take up coverage for which they are being charged (and to use free
Medicaid instead)? Cutler and Gruber ﬁnd no evidence of an eﬀect of
Medicaid eligibility on employer decisions to oﬀer insurance, however; all
of the crowdout eﬀect appears to come through employee take-up deci-
sions. At the same time, they ﬁnd some suggestive evidence that employers
are increasing premium sharing in response to the expansions, in order to
induce lower take-up of workplace coverage and a shift to the public pro-
gram. Shore-Sheppard, Buchmueller, and Jensen (2000) also ﬁnd no im-
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crowdout is occurring through employee take-up.
At the most fundamental level, understanding crowdout requires under-
standing the process by which ﬁrms set wages, and in particular how ﬁnely
ﬁrms could increase the wages of particular workers who leave the ﬁrm to
join the Medicaid program. Gruber (2000) reviews the literature on wage
shifting and concludes that there is strong evidence of full shifting of in-
surance costs to wages on average, but little evidence on this critical ques-
tion of how ﬁnely shifting can be done.
1.4.4 Eﬀects of Medicaid Entitlement on Utilization of Health Care and
Health Outcomes13
A natural motivation for increasing the eligibility of the low-income
population for public insurance is to improve their health. But, as high-
lighted above, there are a number of reasons why increased health insur-
ance does not guarantee improved health outcomes. Thus, simply docu-
menting that the Medicaid expansions increased insurance coverage is not
enough to prove that they improved health. In this section, I therefore re-
view studies that focus directly on the eﬀects of the expansions on medical
care utilization and health outcomes. These studies focus in particular on
use of preventative care and on directly measurable outcomes such as mor-
tality and fetal health (e.g., low birthweight).14
A number of studies have assessed the eﬀects of Medicaid by comparing
the utilization and health of persons with Medicaid coverage to those of
the uninsured. These studies have shown that uninsured persons have
lower utilization levels, a less eﬃcient distribution of utilization across
sites of care, and worse health outcomes (e.g., Kasper 1986; Short and
Lefkowitz 1992; Mullahy 1994). But since the uninsured are likely to diﬀer
from the insured in both observable and unobservable respects, it is diﬃ-
cult to draw causal inferences from these types of comparisons. Further-
more, insurance coverage itself may be a function of health status, leading
to endogeneity bias in estimates of the eﬀects of insurance on health and
on the utilization of medical care.
A natural alternative approach to analyzing the eﬀect of Medicaid on
utilization and health is to contrast the experience of a single state before
and after a Medicaid program expansion. This approach has been the fo-
cus of three important studies of prenatal care use and infant outcomes:
Piper, Riley, and Griﬃn (1990), Hass et al. (1993), and Epstein and New-
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13. This subsection draws heavily on Gruber (1997).
14. This focus is dictated by the empirical diﬃculties with using measures of acute care
(since, if Medicaid aﬀects health, it will have a feedback eﬀect on use of acute care) and self-
reported health (since increased contacts with the medical system may worsen perceptions of
health through improved medical information). See Currie and Gruber (1996b) for a more de-
tailed discussion of these issues.house (1998). Piper, Riley, and Griﬃn analyzed the eﬀect of the extension
of Medicaid coverage to low-income married women in Tennessee in 1985;
Hass et al. examined the eﬀect of expanding insurance to women with in-
comes under 185 percent of the poverty line in Massachusetts in 1985; and
Epstein and Newhouse look at expansions from the poverty line to 185 per-
cent of the poverty line in Medicaid eligibility among women in South Car-
olina and California.15
All of these studies have a common ﬁnding: There was no consistent
eﬀect of insurance expansions on either use of prenatal care or infant out-
comes. Piper, Riley, and Griﬃn (1990) suggest one reason for this ﬁnding:
More than two-thirds of the women who were eligible for Medicaid enrolled
after the ﬁrst trimester of pregnancy; almost 30 percent enrolled in the last
thirty days before birth.16 The extent of late enrollment grew after the ex-
pansion of Medicaid, suggesting that the newly eligible were enrolling even
later. Ellwood and Kenney (1995) use more recent data to refute this con-
tention, however, ﬁnding that, among women who were newly enrolled for
their pregnancy, the expansion population was as successful as the AFDC
population in enrolling the ﬁrst trimester. Even in the Ellwood and Kenney
data, however, only about one-half of the newly enrolling women were en-
rolled during the ﬁrst trimester. A large literature on the eﬀectiveness of pre-
natal care suggests that it is receipt of care in the ﬁrst trimester that is key
for improving fetal health (Institute of Medicine 1985). Thus, it is perhaps
unsurprising that there was no eﬀect on outcomes of these expansions.
While informative, these studies suﬀer from two potentially important
problems. First, they are unable to control for correlated time series trends
in the use of prenatal care and birth outcomes. There are a number of other
changes in the circumstances of low-income households in the 1980s that
might lead to lower use of prenatal care or worse outcomes, such as the ero-
sion of the real earnings of low wage earners (Katz and Murphy 1992).
These could interfere with uncovering the true eﬀect of the Medicaid ex-
pansion. Second, the experience of one state’s program may not be broadly
prescriptive for the eﬀects of national Medicaid policy.
An alternative approach involves using the experience of not just one or
two states, but all of the states, to assess the eﬀects of changing Medicaid
policy. By comparing more broadly states that do and do not increase Med-
icaid generosity over time, one can also control for correlated time series
trends. This is the approach taken by Currie and Gruber (1996b) for the
case of prenatal care utilization and infant outcomes, and Currie and
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15. The Massachusetts expansion was not technically a Medicaid policy, but rather a state-
only program for the uninsured; but it foreshadowed the expansions that would be imple-
mented under the Medicaid programs several years later.
16. Howell and Ellwood (1991) study this question for an earlier period (1983), and they
ﬁnd that roughly 50–60 percent of women whose deliveries were paid for by Medicaid were
enrolled in Medicaid in the ﬁrst trimester.Gruber (1996a) for the case of child health care utilization and health out-
comes. In both cases, the authors use individual-level data on health care
utilization, either from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth
(NLSY) on prenatal care utilization, or from the National Health Inter-
view Survey (NHIS) on child health care utilization. They combine this
with aggregate data on mortality outcomes from the Vital Statistics. In all
cases, the data are a time series of national cross sections, providing infor-
mation on a number of states over time.
The measure of utilization for pregnant women is whether these women
delayed their prenatal care until after the ﬁrst trimester of pregnancy. In
fact, in contrast to the pre-post studies described earlier, there is a large im-
provement in prenatal care utilization associated with Medicaid eligibility.
Making someone eligible for Medicaid lowers the odds of her delaying pre-
natal care by almost 50 percentage points, which is essentially a 100 reduc-
tion in the odds of delaying care. Currie and Gruber (1996a) also ﬁnd a siz-
able eﬀect of Medicaid on use of preventive care by children: Being made
eligible for Medicaid is associated with a drop in the probability of going
without a visit over a year of almost 10 percent; this is almost one-half of
the baseline probability of going without a visit.
Dubay et al. (2000) take a somewhat diﬀerent approach from that of
Currie and Gruber, examining time series trends in prenatal care utiliza-
tion by socioeconomic groups more and less likely to be aﬀected by the ex-
pansions. But they also ﬁnd signiﬁcant impacts of the expansions in terms
of reducing the extent of delayed initiation of prenatal care. Thus, there ap-
pears to be clear evidence of beneﬁts of the expansions in terms of medical
care utilization.
Kaestner, Joyce, and Racine (1999) and Dafny and Gruber (2000) ex-
plore the impact of the Medicaid expansions not just on the level of hospi-
talizations of children, but also on the nature of those hospitalizations.
Dafny and Gruber ﬁnd, like Currie and Gruber (1996a), that increased
Medicaid eligibility of children leads to more hospitalizations overall. But
both articles ﬁnd that eligibility leads to fewer “avoidable” hospitaliza-
tions, or those hospitalizations that are likely to be avoided by early con-
tact with a primary care physician. This suggests that Medicaid coverage
increases not just utilization but also the eﬃciency with which care is used.
One interesting feature of the expansions is their eﬀect not only on mean
utilization but also on the distribution of utilization. Currie and Gruber
(1996a) and Currie (1996) explore the diﬀerential impact of the expansions
by race, education, and immigrant status. In all cases there are some equal-
ization impacts, with the utilization eﬀects being particularly large for
blacks, low-education groups, and immigrants.
Currie and Gruber (2001) further investigate the impact of the Medicaid
expansions on the treatment of women at childbirth. They use information
from birth certiﬁcate data on utilization of obstetric procedures during
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vide the population of women into two groups: teen mothers and high
school dropouts (“low education”) and all others (“high education”).
Mothers in the former group are quite likely to have been uninsured before
enrolling in Medicaid, whereas mothers in the latter group were much
more likely to have been privately insured. For the low-education mothers,
they ﬁnd sizable and signiﬁcant positive eﬀects of eligibility for Medicaid
on the treatment of childbirth for the lower-education group; there is a uni-
form increase in the likelihood that women receive each of the procedures
documented on birth certiﬁcates.17
But they also note that even if there is little net increase in insurance cov-
erage for other mothers, this does not mean that there is no eﬀect on their
procedure use. Medicaid reimburses hospitals at a much lower level than
do most private insurance plans. Thus, crowdout represents a shift from
more to less generous insurance coverage for women, which may aﬀect
their procedure use even as their overall insurance coverage status does not
change. Indeed, for these mothers, they ﬁnd the eﬀect opposite to that for
low-education mothers: a signiﬁcant reduction in the use of three of the
ﬁve obstetrical procedures studied, and no eﬀect on the other two. Overall,
in fact, procedure use was basically unchanged in every case. That is, while
Medicaid costs were rising substantially, social costs of treatment were un-
changed: Women were obtaining the same treatment as before on average,
with an equalizing trend toward more intensive treatment for low-
education groups and less intensive treatment for higher-education groups.
Currie and Gruber (1996b) also ﬁnd signiﬁcant improvements in infant
health from the Medicaid expansions. They estimate that each 10 percent-
age point increase in Medicaid eligibility lowered infant mortality by 0.03
percentage points, so that the 30 percent rise in eligibility over the 1979 to
1992 period was associated with a 8.5 percent decline in the infant mortal-
ity rate. There is a smaller and marginally signiﬁcant eﬀect on low birth
weight. The authors go on to draw a distinction between two types of Med-
icaid policies during the 1979–92 period: “targeted” eligibility changes
through 1987, which were addressed to very low-income populations in-
cluding AFDC recipients; and the “broad” expansions after 1987, which
were addressed to somewhat higher-income groups. As that paper high-
lights, these diﬀerent types of policies aﬀected quite diﬀerent populations;
in particular, the persons covered by the broad expansions had higher in-
comes and were more likely to be privately insured. As a result, the take-up
of the targeted expansions was three times as high as take-up of the broad
expansions.
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17. This echoes ﬁndings for the state of Massachusetts expansions in Hass, Udarhelyi, and
Epstein (1993), who showed that this eligibility increase was associated with a rise in the rate
of cesarean section delivery. On the other hand, Epstein and Newhouse (1998) do not ﬁnd
consistent eﬀects of expansions in California and South Carolina on cesarean section rates.The authors then note that there were correspondingly diﬀerent eﬀects
on outcomes from these two types of policies. There were very sizable eﬀects
of the targeted expansions on mortality, but only an insigniﬁcant eﬀect of
broad expansions: A 30 percentage point increase in targeted eligibility
would have been associated with a 11.5 percent decline in infant mortality,
compared to a 2.9 percent decline under the broad policy changes. There is
also a very sizable reduction in the incidence of low birth weight associated
with the targeted expansions (7.8 percent for a 30 percentage point eligibil-
ity increase), but there is no eﬀect on low birth weight from the broad ex-
pansions.
Medicaid reduces the mortality of older children as well. Currie and
Gruber (1996a) ﬁnd that for every 10 percentage point increase in the frac-
tion of children eligible for Medicaid, mortality drops by 0.013 percentage
points; the 15.1 percentage point rise in eligibility between 1984 and 1992
is therefore estimated to have decreased child mortality by 5.1 percent.
There is less consistency in the literature, however, on the health beneﬁts
of the Medicaid expansions. Kaestner, Joyce, and Racine (1999) ﬁnd no
impact of Medicaid on self-reported health status and bed days, compar-
ing income groups more and less likely to be eligible for expansion-based
eligibility across states. One diﬃculty with this approach is that changes in
subjective measures of health are hard to evaluate when access to care is
changing; if insurance coverage leads to more contacts with physicians that
reveal underlying health problems, this can lead to both worse self-
assessed health status and more bed days. Dubay et al. (2000) do use ob-
jective data on birth weight, and they ﬁnd little impact of the expansions
on the incidence of low birth weight, despite the improvements in prenatal
care adequacy noted above. These ﬁndings are consistent with the conclu-
sion that the broader Medicaid expansions to pregnant women higher up
the income scale of the late 1980s and early 1990s had minimal measured
impacts on health.
A natural means of evaluating these ﬁndings is to consider the cost to the
Medicaid program per life saved. This can be calculated by modeling ad-
ministrative spending for each state or year on the Medicaid program as a
function of changes in eligibility, and comparing these cost changes to any
outcome improvements. For infants, the cost is roughly $1 million; in fact,
when Currie and Gruber once again disaggregate into the targeted and
broad policy changes, they ﬁnd that the cost under the targeted changes
($840,000) was much lower than under the broad expansions ($4 million).
For children, the cost per life saved is $1.6 million. As Currie and Gruber
(1996b) discuss, these costs are low relative to typical estimates of the value
of an adult life ($3–7 million) and relative to what the government spends
to save child lives in other contexts.
A ﬁnal area of interest with respect to the Medicaid entitlement is the
impact of restrictions on services. As discussed earlier, most of the major
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teresting variation in copayments and limits on the availability of pre-
scription drugs. Stuart and Zacker (1999) ﬁnd that elderly and disabled
Medicaid recipients who reside in states with copayments for drugs have
signiﬁcantly lower rates of drug use than their counterparts in states with-
out copayments; the primary channel for this eﬀect appears to be through
the likelihood of ﬁlling any prescription during the year, not the condi-
tional number ﬁlled. Soumerai et al. (1994) found that limits on the use of
antipsychotic drugs in New Hampshire lead to less use of these drugs and
more spending on acute mental health services. These sets of results are
provocative and suggest the value of additional work that carefully assesses
the costs and beneﬁts of prescription drug limitations under Medicaid.
1.4.5 Impact of Medicaid Reimbursement Policy on Utilization and
Health Outcomes
The discussion thus far has focused on policies that increase the demand
for medical care. But for a number of reasons it may be supply side policies
that are more eﬀective. As noted above, there is a shortage of physicians
willing to serve the Medicaid population. This suggests that increased de-
mand for services generated by expansions of the Medicaid program could
go largely unmet, undercutting any potential gains.
One natural supply side tool is Medicaid fee policy. The low fees paid by
state Medicaid programs represent a major potential deterrent to physi-
cian willingness to see Medicaid patients. Holahan (1991) reports that the
ratio of Medicaid fees to private fees was approximately 0.5 for most pro-
cedures surveyed, and 0.56 for total obstetrical care with vaginal delivery.
And the Physician Payment Review Commission (1991) found that thirty-
eight states identiﬁed low fees as the major cause of low physician partici-
pation rates. A large body of research suggests that increasing the ratio of
Medicaid fees relative to private-sector fees will increase physician partic-
ipation in the Medicaid program (Hadley 1979; Sloan, Mitchell, and
Cromwell 1978; Held and Holahan 1985; Mitchell 1991). Mitchell and
Schurman (1984) and Adams (1994) ﬁnd that the participation of OB/
GYNs is especially responsive to fee increases.
More recent work, however, suggests that physician responsiveness to
fees may be somewhat more limited than was implied by the previous liter-
ature. Baker (1997) ﬁnds that higher fees are associated with more access
to public and hospital clinics, but not to physician’s oﬃces. Decker (1992)
ﬁnds that higher fees are not associated with increased physician willing-
ness to see Medicaid patients but are associated with a shift from general
practitioner to specialist visits. These ﬁndings do not forcefully dispute the
raw contention that Medicaid fee increases raise access to ambulatory
care, but they do suggest that more work is needed on the mechanisms by
which higher fees have these impacts.
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comes, due to the physician segregation noted above; only if fee increases
generate improvements in access in the places where Medicaid recipients
live will there be health improvements. Direct evidence on this question is
provided by Gruber, Adams, and Newhouse (1996), who examined access
to physicians after a large fee increase in Tennessee. They ﬁnd that there
was a sizable, but insigniﬁcant, fall in the average distance of Medicaid pa-
tients from a physician. Decker (1992) also ﬁnds that higher fees lead
physicians to spend more time with their Medicaid patients.
Currie, Gruber, and Fischer (1995) examine directly the eﬀect of the rel-
ative fees paid to physicians by the Medicaid program on infant mortality,
using matched measures of state/year infant mortality rates, physician fee
indexes, and physician and total medical spending. They ﬁnd that, over the
entire 1979–92 period, there is a signiﬁcant but small impact of higher fees
in terms of lowering infant mortality; doubling the fee ratio would lower
mortality by 5.2 to 7 percent. But they ﬁnd that the cost was low as well,
with the physician cost per life saved ranging from $260,000 to $1.3 million
depending on the speciﬁcation. They also ﬁnd some evidence of a coun-
tervailing “oﬀset” eﬀect on hospital spending, with hospital spending
falling by a substantial amount to oﬀset the increased physician costs. This
is consistent with the ﬁndings in Gruber, Adams, and Newhouse (1996),
who ﬁnd that after the state of Tennessee increased its physician fees,
physician spending rose, but hospital spending fell. Gray (1999), using mi-
crodata on birth outcomes matched to physician fee information, produces
an even larger eﬀect of fees on outcomes. Overall, raising physician fees
seems a much more eﬃcient route to improved outcomes than the broad
expansions.
Higher physician fees can aﬀect not only the access of Medicaid patients
to the physician, but also how patients are treated by physicians. A large
literature on the impact of Medicare reimbursement on treatment intensity
suggests that higher Medicare reimbursement leads to lower intensity, as
physician income eﬀects dominate substitution eﬀects. But the typical doc-
tor who sees Medicaid patients has a relatively small share of his practice
made up of Medicaid patients, so it is plausible that income eﬀects might
be weaker in this context. Indeed, Gruber, Kim, and Mayzlin (1999) ﬁnd
that higher Medicaid fee diﬀerentials for cesarean section delivery are as-
sociated with higher rates of cesarean delivery among Medicaid patients;
they estimate that as much as one-half of the sizable diﬀerential in cesarean
delivery rates between Medicaid and private-pay patients is due to lower
Medicaid reimbursement levels.
Of course, physicians are not the only health care providers reimbursed
by Medicaid. However, the literature on Medicaid reimbursement in other
arenas is much more sparse. There was some work in the late 1980s on
Medicaid hospital reimbursement, but virtually no work since. These stud-
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tive payment systems were successful in lowering costs in the short run but
not in the long run. Rather, to control costs in the long run, it was impor-
tant to embed Medicaid reimbursement within a systemwide reimburse-
ment structure that regulates all payers. Holahan also reports some evi-
dence that states with lower per diem reimbursements under Medicaid
feature lower access of Medicaid patients to hospitals, particularly among
nongovernmental hospitals, so that lower rates led to a net shift of Medic-
aid patients to government hospitals. He also ﬁnds sharp one-time gains
from the selective contracting program in California that negotiated rates
with hospitals, but he once again raises questions about whether price ne-
gotiation will continue to work over the long term.
A provocative recent study by Duggan (1999) examines the impact of
DSH payments on hospital behavior in California. He ﬁnds that these
transfers have little impact on the treatment of low-income populations:
Private hospitals simply absorb the payments in higher proﬁts (for for-
proﬁts hospitals) or higher retained net worth (for not-for-proﬁt hospi-
tals); and public hospitals saw no net increase in available funds because
local governments cut their public subsidies one for one with the rise in fed-
eral subsidies. Consistent with these results, he ﬁnds no impact of larger
DSH payments on the birth outcomes of women in California.
The lack of work on Medicaid hospital reimbursement, given the enor-
mous volume of literature on Medicare hospital reimbursement, is strik-
ing. Variations across states, and within states over time, in Medicaid re-
imbursement policies oﬀer the potential for rich investigation of how
hospitals respond to reimbursement diﬀerences. Moreover, there is no
work on the health impacts of these hospital responses. Although state re-
imbursement rules may be diﬃcult to obtain, this is clearly an interesting
area for future work.
1.4.6 Medicaid and Long-Term Care
Another literature of particular interest is the work on Medicaid reim-
bursement of nursing homes, access to care by Medicaid patients, and
quality of care delivered. This literature is nicely reviewed in Norton (2000).
There are two important issues raised in this literature. The ﬁrst is how
Medicaid policy aﬀects access to, and demand for, nursing home stays by
the elderly. A key issue here is that the market for nursing home stays may
not be in equilibrium. A number of articles argue that due to government
regulation, nursing homes are at full capacity and face excess demand from
Medicaid patients who pay nothing out of pocket for care (Scanlon 1980;
Nyman 1989). Other research has also found that Medicaid patients have
less access to nursing homes than their private-pay counterparts, which is
consistent with the excess demand interpretation. This also has the impor-
tant implication that the frail elderly may spend more time in hospitals
Medicaid 61when they are Medicaid ﬁnanced, oﬀsetting some of the savings to the
Medicaid program from lower nursing home reimbursement rates. Gruen-
berg and Willemain (1982) found that the length of stay in Massachusetts
hospitals was longer for Medicaid patients waiting for placement in a nurs-
ing home, and Ettner (1993) also found evidence that Medicaid patients
have more nursing home access problems than private patients. She found
that Medicaid patients in areas with relatively low bed supply and in areas
with greater demand from private patients were more likely to be on a wait-
ing list for admission to a nursing home.
On the other hand, some work ﬁnds that more generous Medicaid sub-
sidies to nursing home care increase overall nursing home utilization (not
just relative utilization of those on Medicaid), which is not consistent with
excess demand. Hoerger, Picone, and Sloan (1996) and Cutler and Sheiner
(1994) both ﬁnd that elderly persons are more likely to use a nursing home
when Medicaid eligibility is looser and Medicaid reimbursement is more
generous. Cutler and Sheiner also ﬁnd that these state policies appear to
draw persons into nursing homes who would otherwise live with their chil-
dren; this suggests that the beneﬁts of more generous Medicaid systems
may largely accrue to children who would otherwise have to support their
elderly parents. And Hoerger, Picone, and Sloan ﬁnd that increased Med-
icaid home health expenditures are not associated with reduced use of in-
stitutional care, but simply with reduced use of care from other family
members; this is consistent with the experimental evidence from the
chanelling experiment of the 1970s, which found that more generous home
care did not reduce the use of institutional care (Norton 2000).
The second issue is how Medicaid reimbursement aﬀects the quality of
nursing home care. Gertler (1989) and Nyman (1985) make an important
theoretical observation about Medicaid fee policy toward nursing homes.
Nursing homes compete for private patients over both price and quality,
and Medicaid patients will accept minimum quality since the care is free.
Common quality is assumed to be provided across patient types; that is,
quality is a “public good.”18 Moreover, as noted above, nursing homes are
assumed to be at full capacity and face excess demand from Medicaid pa-
tients who pay nothing out of pocket for care. As Medicaid raises its reim-
bursement in this model, nursing homes on the margin will want more
Medicaid patients, which means they will need fewer private-pay patients.
They therefore raise price and lower quality to their private-pay patients to
reach equilibrium. As a result, since common quality is provided, higher
Medicaid reimbursement leads to lower quality care.
Gertler (1989) provides evidence to support this hypothesis, using an in-
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18. This is the key assumption of the model, and an interesting question for future investi-
gation is whether this assumption is truly warranted in the nursing home setting; there is sub-
stantial evidence from physician and hospital settings that patients with diﬀerent payer
sources are treated diﬀerently.put-based measure of quality across a sample of nursing homes. He ﬁnds
that higher Medicaid reimbursement is indeed associated with lower qual-
ity of care along this metric. Gertler (1992) uses data for New York state to
estimate that a 10 percent increase in Medicaid expenditures leads to 4.1
percent increase in Medicaid patient care and a 3.4 percent reduction in
nursing home expenditures on services provided to patients. This suggests
both substantial public-sector costs and private quality costs to attempting
to improve the access of low-income patients to nursing homes.
This test has been recently updated in Grabowski (2001). This study im-
proves on previous tests along three dimensions: by using national, rather
than state-speciﬁc data; by using the substantial and exogenous variation
in average Medicaid reimbursement available across the states; and by us-
ing an outcome-based measure of quality (facility-acquired pressure
sores). In fact, Grabowski ﬁnds that Medicaid reimbursement is positively
associated with quality, in contrast to previous evidence and to the theory
laid out above. Moreover, this positive association is found both in the
early 1980s and in more recent years, and in both a sample of New York
homes and the national sample. These ﬁndings cast signiﬁcant doubt on
the validity of the previous empirical literature and suggest the value in un-
derstanding where this model breaks down; a natural candidate may be the
untested assumption that quality is a common good in nursing homes.
1.4.7 Medicaid, Labor Force Participation, and Welfare Participation
As discussed earlier, the fact that low-income households can obtain
fairly high-quality insurance through the Medicaid program by being on
cash welfare, but are unlikely to obtain that coverage in the low-wage labor
market, provides a substantial disincentive to leaving welfare (“welfare
lock”). Given the existence of welfare lock, one potential advantage of de-
coupling Medicaid from the AFDC program is that it could allow individ-
uals to leave AFDC without fear of losing insurance for their children or
for the costs of pregnancy. The result would be lower costs of the AFDC
program, as well as potential tax revenues from the earnings of these new
workers. The magnitude of the welfare lock problem, however, is uncertain:
Given the harsh job prospects for low-income populations, even with
health insurance they may be reluctant to leave the welfare rolls.
The magnitude of welfare lock has been the subject of a number of stud-
ies, as reviewed in Gruber (2000). There have been three basic empirical
approaches used in this literature. The ﬁrst is to use diﬀerences in individ-
ual characteristics to predict who is likely to be “locked” into the AFDC
program by Medicaid due to high medical spending, and then to assess di-
ﬀerential participation rates by this imputed value of Medicaid. Ellwood
and Adams (1990) follow this approach using administrative Medicaid
claims data to examine exits from AFDC, and Moﬃtt and Wolfe (1992)
model participation as a function of imputed value in the SIPP. The results
Medicaid 63are fairly similar, showing sizable decreases in the likelihood of exiting
AFDC as the imputed value of Medicaid rises.
The second approach is to abstract from individual health and to use
variation in the characteristics of state Medicaid programs to identify the
value of Medicaid to the potential AFDC participant.19 Blank (1989) was
the ﬁrst to pursue this approach, estimating models of AFDC participa-
tion and hours of work on average state Medicaid expenditures and the
presence of a state Medically Needy program, which provides Medicaid to
non-AFDC families if their income net of medical expenditures falls below
a certain ﬂoor. She ﬁnds no eﬀect of either policy variable on AFDC par-
ticipation. Winkler (1991) also ﬁnds no eﬀect of average expenditures on
AFDC participation, but he does ﬁnd an eﬀect of average expenditures on
labor force participation, a ﬁnding echoed by Montgomery and Navin
(1996), albeit with a much smaller estimate. But there is no eﬀect of Med-
icaid expenditures on participation in Montgomery and Navin’s work af-
ter state ﬁxed eﬀects are included in the regression models.
The third approach that has been taken to this question extends the no-
tion of using state parameters by exploiting the variation that comes from
the Medicaid expansions. As Yelowitz (1995) notes, these expansions
served to decouple Medicaid eligibility from AFDC receipt, thereby pro-
viding precisely the variation needed to separately identify the role of Med-
icaid from that of other factors in determining welfare participation. A key
feature of these expansions was variation across the states in the timing and
generosity of increased income limits. Indeed, there was even variation
within states at a point in time, due to diﬀerent age cutoﬀs for eligibility of
children across the states. This allows Yelowitz to form plausibly identical
groups of families, some of which (the “treatments”) were able to leave
AFDC and retain their Medicaid coverage, and others of which (the “con-
trols”) were not. And he ﬁnds signiﬁcant eﬀects of being in the treatment
group on both AFDC participation and labor force participation: He esti-
mates that increasing the income cutoﬀ for eligibility by 25 percent of the
poverty line decreases AFDC participation by 4.6 percent and increases
labor force participation by 3.3 percent. More recent work by Meyer and
Rosenbaum (1999), however, suggests that the Yelowitz ﬁndings may be
fragile, as they ﬁnd no large eﬀects from a diﬀerent speciﬁcation over a
later set of years. Ham and Shore-Sheppard (1999) also ﬁnd small eﬀects
of Medicaid entitlement on transitions both oﬀ and on to welfare.
A related approach is taken by Decker (1994). She examines the eﬀect of
the introduction of the Medicaid program in the late 1960s and early 1970s
on AFDC participation in that era. Since the Medicaid program was phased
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19. Features of the state Medicaid program are included in the set of variables used to pre-
dict Moﬃtt and Wolfe’s (1992) index, but the papers discussed here use only state features for
identiﬁcation.in across the states over a period of several years, she is able to assess whether
states that adopted Medicaid saw a subsequent increase in their AFDC
rolls, relative to states that did not. In fact, she ﬁnds a very strong eﬀect, with
the introduction of Medicaid leading to a 6.4 percentage point (24 percent)
rise in the odds that a single female head participates in AFDC.20
In a series of subsequent studies, Yelowitz has explored the eﬀect of
Medicaid on participation in other public assistance programs. The ﬁrst is
SSI; as Yelowitz emphasizes, this program is actually larger in dollar terms
than is AFDC, and the same type of welfare lock problem arises in this
context. For elderly SSI recipients, this problem arises because the Medic-
aid coverage that they receive on SSI pays for their noncovered Medicare
expenditures. Using an expansion of Medicaid for the elderly, Yelowitz
(2000b) ﬁnds a nontrivial welfare lock for this population as well. For the
disabled, who get Medicaid if on SSI, Yelowitz (1998a) follows the second
approach noted above, using variation across states in the Medicaid spend-
ing to proxy for the program’s generosity. He ﬁnds that the growth in Med-
icaid generosity over 1987–93 can explain almost all of the substantial
growth in the SSI disabled caseload. Finally, Yelowitz (1996) asks whether
increased eligibility for Medicaid raises utilization of the food stamps
program, both through reducing labor supply and increasing awareness
of public assistance programs. Using the same estimation approach as
Yelowitz (1995), he ﬁnds that Medicaid eligibility does increase food stamp
participation and that this increase occurs through both channels.
Thus, to summarize, this literature suggests that health insurance is a
very important determinant of public assistance participation. This has
two important welfare implications. First, it suggests that reduced public
assistance expenditures may oﬀset a share of the increased costs of ex-
panding health insurance availability. Yelowitz (1995) estimates that ex-
panding eligibility for Medicaid to all women and children with incomes
below 185 percent of the poverty line in 1989 would have saved the gov-
ernment $410 in expenditures per female-headed household per year. Sec-
ond, there may be nonﬁnancial costs to the increase in welfare dependence
that results from welfare lock. A number of analysts have suggested a hys-
teresis-type model of welfare behavior, with exposure to the welfare system
increasing future utilization by both a mother and her children as adults
(Murray 1984). Existing evidence on welfare dependence is mixed, with
some recent studies concluding that there is little intergenerational trans-
mission of welfare (Zimmerman and Levine 1993). But this possibility
highlights the beneﬁts of moving welfare recipients oﬀ the public assis-
tance rolls through reducing welfare lock.
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20. For this era, however, her results indicate that this increase is primarily due to increased
take-up among those already eligible for AFDC, notto reduced labor supply in order to make
oneself eligible; the labor supply eﬀects are imprecisely estimated, however.Reducing welfare lock through public insurance expansions can also
have additional eﬀects on labor market equilibrium, through adjustments
of private insurance coverage and wages, as discussed earlier. But there is
no empirical work to date on the eﬀect of the expansions on job mobility,
wages, or employment determination.
1.4.8 Medicaid and Family Structure
As discussed earlier, Medicaid can also have eﬀects on family structure,
along two channels. The ﬁrst is marriage: By tying receipt of Medicaid to
receipt of cash welfare that requires being nonmarried (in the main), public
policy provides a disincentive to marriage. Yelowitz (1995) once again uses
the structure of the Medicaid expansions of the 1988–91 period to explore
this issue, by assessing whether women who were made eligible for the in-
surance in the state of marriage were then more likely to get married. He
ﬁnds a small but signiﬁcant eﬀect on marriage propensities from the Med-
icaid expansions through this channel.21
The second is fertility: As noted above, Medicaid expansions can in prin-
ciple increase fertility by lowering the cost of bearing and raising children.
Indeed, Joyce, Kaestner, and Kwan (1998) do ﬁnd that Medicaid entitle-
ment for pregnancy expenses for low-education women was associated
with a 5 percent increase in the fertility rate for white women; this arises
partly through reduced abortions (see the discussion that follows). This is
a striking ﬁnding and provides conﬁrmation that insurance coverage can
matter for fertility decisions. This paper does not, however, address two
important questions about this ﬁnding. First, does this represent a perma-
nent upward shift in fertility rates, or simply a shift in the timing of when
children are born (i.e., children are born earlier than they otherwise would,
which appears to be a rise in the fertility rate in a cross section)? Second,
how much of this impact is due to coverage of pregnancy per se, as opposed
to correlated expansions in the coverage of children that may have a larger
impact on the net cost of raising a child?
Another channel through which Medicaid can aﬀect fertility is abortion
decisions. Medicaid ﬁnancing of abortion has been a contentious issue for
many years, and there has been signiﬁcant variation in reimbursement pol-
icy. Several recent papers (Haas-Wilson 1994; Blank, George, and London
1996; Levine, Trainor, and Zimmerman 1996; Kane and Staiger 1996) have
found that restricting Medicaid funding of abortions signiﬁcantly reduces
teen and aggregate abortion rates. At the same time, the last two of these
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21. As Yelowitz notes, there is in fact a countervailing inﬂuence here. For some women who
were married to their husbands just to get health insurance, the increased income cutoﬀs
would allow them to divorce their husbands but maintain coverage. He is able to distinguish
this eﬀect from the marriage incentive eﬀect described above by separating changes in income
cutoﬀs from changes in coverage of traditional families. He ﬁnds that both eﬀects are present
but that the positive marriage incentive eﬀect predominates.papers also ﬁnd little impact on teen births. This suggests that restrictions
on abortion access lead to fewer pregnancies (through more preventative
measures by teens), oﬀsetting the reduction in abortion access. Joyce and
Kaestner (1996) ﬁnd that Medicaid eligibility itself is associated with re-
ductions in the abortion rate among white women, which is consistent with
the impacts on fertility documented above.
1.4.9 Medicaid and Saving
The ﬁnal area of work on Medicaid and economic behavior is on saving,
in two areas. Gruber and Yelowitz (1999) explore the impact of the Medic-
aid expansions for children and pregnant women on saving and consump-
tion. They ﬁnd that the expansions led to both lower saving and higher
consumption, conﬁrming in two data sets that the type of precautionary
saving eﬀects discussed in Kotlikoﬀ (1988) or Hubbard, Skinner, and
Zeldes (1995) are empirically important. In particular, they ﬁnd that in
1993 the Medicaid program lowered the wealth holdings of eligible house-
holds by 16.3 percent. They also ﬁnd that the expansions of this program
over the 1984–93 period lowered wealth holdings by 7.2 percent. And they
use the fact that the expansions were accompanied by the removal of asset
testing for Medicaid eligibility in many states to document that asset test-
ing is also an important determinant of savings: The reduction in savings
for those becoming eligible for Medicaid in a regime where there is asset
testing is twice as large as for those becoming eligible in a regime without
asset testing.
The other area in which the impacts of Medicaid on saving have been in-
vestigated is in terms of nursing home coverage. Theory would suggest that
there could be potentially quite large impacts on savings of Medicaid
entitlement to nursing home coverage, since nursing home care is very ex-
pensive, so that precautionary savings may be large. Norton and Kumar
(1998) investigate whether the spousal impoverishment provisions of the
Medicare Catastrophic Care Act of 1988, which (as noted earlier) allowed
families to shield signiﬁcant assets with a community-based spouse, led
tohigher savings. Using data on community or institutionally basedchroni-
cally impaired couples, they ﬁnd no higher savings after this act among
couples with a community-based spouse and singles without such a
spouse.
Moreover, very few persons spend down to Medicaid eligibility after en-
tering the nursing home. Although roughly 40 percent of new admissions
are covered by Medicaid, and there is a perception in the popular press that
spend-down is widespread, less than 20 percent of persons who are private-
pay at admission actually spend down after admission (Norton 2000).
Evidence on whether the elderly transfer assets to others to avoid the im-
plicit Medicaid “tax” is mixed. Norton (1995) uses data from two diﬀerent
samples of the elderly to predict the distribution of time until spend-down
Medicaid 67according to a model of spend-down absent of behavioral eﬀects. These
distributions were then compared to the actual distribution of the time
until spend-down for nursing home residents. Contrary to expectations, it
appears that the elderly avoid Medicaid eligibility. This result cannot be ex-
plained away by sample selection, demographics, or uncertainty about
prices.
1.5 Implications and Unanswered Questions
As is clear from the foregoing discussion, there is a large and rich litera-
ture exploring the impacts of Medicaid on individual behavior and out-
comes. This literature has a number of important policy implications. But,
in thinking through policy directions, it also becomes apparent that there
are a number of unanswered questions about Medicaid’s impacts as well.
1.5.1 Eligibility Policy
The ﬁrst area of policy that is informed by this literature is Medicaid el-
igibility policy as a tool for dealing with the large and growing number of
uninsured individuals in the United States. One straightforward alternative
for increasing insurance coverage is to continue to expand our public in-
surance safety net. This was the approach taken by the CHIP expansion.
The problem with this approach is that the CHIP program will be spending
its dollars primarily on those children around 200 percent of poverty, and
this is a population that is heavily privately insured already. For example,
among those children between 200 and 250 percent of poverty, only 14 per-
cent are uninsured, and almost 80 percent already have private health in-
surance. A key lesson from the recent literature on Medicaid is that crowd-
out may be a signiﬁcant concern under these types of conditions. As a
result, there could be relatively low “bang for the buck,” with most public
dollars going to those already insured and switching to the public program.
On the other hand, the ﬂexibilities built into CHIP are likely to help mit-
igate crowdout. By making the beneﬁts package less generous than Medic-
aid, and by introducing premiums and copayments for services, state
CHIP programs make it less attractive to drop one’s private health insur-
ance to join the public program. Clearly, as public insurance is expanded
further and further up the income scale, given the strong correlation be-
tween income and private insurance coverage, more and more limitation of
this form is called for.
An important priority for research is to assess whether the ﬂexibilities in
CHIP have a real impact on crowdout. Some casual evidence suggests that
they might. Before CHIP, the states of Florida and Minnesota had public
insurance programs for children funded out of state monies only, and these
programs provided insurance that was much more restrictive than Medic-
aid, particularly with regard to premiums for enrollment, where were non-
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than the estimates for the national program, in that fewer than 10 percent
of the enrollees had private insurance before joining the program.22 While
only suggestive, these ﬁndings may provide a key insight into how to com-
bat crowdout, which is to make the public option less attractive. Of course,
what is missing from these analyses is any information on the impact of
these policies on the take-up of the plan by those who were previously
uninsured. If such policies reduce crowdout but reduce take-up by the pre-
viously uninsured even more, they may not be an attractive barrier for com-
bating crowdout. Clearly, more research is needed on how the structure of
public insurance programs inﬂuences both take-up and crowdout.
Although expansions of insurance up the income scale seems an obvious
way to reach more uninsured, the CHIP legislation largely ignored a more
needy and obvious population: those who are already eligible for Medicaid
but do not take it up. Indeed, most estimates suggest that there are on the
order of 4 million children who are eligible for Medicaid but do not take up
coverage. Moreover, as previously noted, there is tremendous underuse of
prenatal care services by women who are Medicaid eligible, particularly
during the ﬁrst trimester. The reasons for this limited take-up are unclear
and reﬂect some mix of poor information about eligibility and stigma
about enrollment in a public insurance program.
Regardless of the cause, however, this is a very high bang-for-the-buck
population. Of those children not on Medicaid already, but with incomes
below 150 percent of the poverty line, 53 percent are uninsured. This sug-
gests that the highest priority for government policy is to expand coverage
of this group through outreach initiatives, even if they are somewhat costly.
In other words, in thinking about expanding insurance coverage in the low-
income population, it is probably best to think about ﬁlling the cup from
the bottom: Start by maximizing the coverage of the lowest-income popu-
lation with few other insurance alternatives, and then move to higher-
income groups that often have access to private coverage.
For largely political reasons, the expansions of health insurance through
both Medicaid and CHIP have focused on children and pregnant women.
But there is little coherent argument for covering an eighteen-year-old
woman up to 200 percent of poverty, while a nineteen-year-old woman re-
ceives no public coverage unless she is pregnant or on welfare. This is par-
ticularly true given the low use of prenatal care by lower-income women; if
they had continuous insurance coverage, they would perhaps be more
likely to seek care as soon as they got pregnant.
One particularly helpful approach that has been proposed is to extend
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22. It is important to note that this does not imply crowdout of less than 10 percent, since
some of those crowded out may not join the program (e.g., through within-family spillovers),
and since some of those joining the program might have lost their private insurance even if
there were no crowdout (e.g., through natural turnover).coverage to the parents of Medicaid and CHIP children. This would have
the additional advantage of increasing take-up by these children, since
once the parents are eligible it might increase their awareness of the entire
family’s entitlement.
In summary, public insurance remains a powerful tool for reducing high
and rising numbers of uninsured in the United States. But the eﬃciency of
diﬀerent public insurance routes may diﬀer dramatically. Public policy
could most usefully focus on the neediest populations ﬁrst, such as those
eligible for and not taking up coverage and other demographically noneli-
gible groups, before moving on to higher-income groups of traditionally el-
igible populations where private coverage is fairly common.
1.5.2 Supply Side
An area that has received less attention, but which may be equally im-
portant, is Medicaid reimbursement policy. Work on physician reimburse-
ment suggests that more generous fee schedules can lead to more access to
physicians for Medicaid patients, and ultimately to better health outcomes.
Of particular interest within the reimbursement arena is an assessment
of the trade-oﬀs between physician and hospital reimbursement levels. Al-
though the evidence cited earlier suggests real costs to low physician reim-
bursement, there is much less evidence suggesting signiﬁcant costs to lower
Medicaid reimbursement of hospitals. Clearly, an important priority for
future work is to think about the trade-oﬀs between the reimbursement lev-
els set for these diﬀerent types of providers.
1.5.3 Long-Term Care
In terms of government spending, the most important area for Medicaid
reform is long-term care. This is the largest share of Medicaid program
spending, and it will clearly grow rapidly with the aging of the population.
The literature on Medicaid long-term care, while limited, suggests three
policy-relevant conclusions. First, if policymakers attempt to control costs
by reducing Medicaid reimbursement levels, they may not sacriﬁce quality
of care (and indeed may actually raise quality). Second, however, lower re-
imbursement levels will lower the access of Medicaid patients to nursing
home care. Third, the beneﬁciaries of more access of Medicaid patients to
nursing home care appear to be the children of these patients with whom
they were living before admission.
These ﬁndings suggest that there is a crowdout-like eﬀect of increasing
Medicaid reimbursement: It raises access for Medicaid patients, but at the
cost of lower quality for private patients. The recent removal of the Boren
amendment, and the resultant ﬂexibility for states to experiment more with
nursing home reimbursement, may provide more evidence on this front.
The last ﬁnding also suggests that if children are the beneﬁciaries of Med-
icaid entitlement, perhaps they should bear more of the costs. As Cutler
70 Jonathan Gruberand Sheiner (1994) note, in Germany, the income of children is counted to-
ward the resource base for paying for nursing home care for elderly par-
ents. Such a system in the United States may more tightly tie the costs of
Medicaid entitlement to the beneﬁciaries.
But there is clearly room for much more work on this important area, as
a host of unanswered questions remain. First, the importance of excess
demand for nursing homes remains unclear; whereas some studies ﬁnd
evidence of excess demand, others ﬁnd that Medicaid generosity increases
lead to more total nursing home care, which is inconsistent with excess de-
mand. Second, more work is needed on the substitutability of home and
community care for institutional care of the elderly. The available research,
mostly from a social experiment run in the 1970s, suggests that there is little
substitutability; more generous home care does not reduce the incidence of
institutional care. But this evidence is old and may no longer be relevant in
the rapidly changing world of home care. More work in this area would be
very useful as Medicaid assesses its spending priorities. Third, it is impor-
tant to assess how states are reacting to their new freedoms with respect to
nursing home reimbursement, and what impacts this has on Medicaid pa-
tient access. Finally, there is almost no work on the impact of policies on
the actual outcomes of the institutionalized elderly. Can Medicaid improve
the health or well-being of the elderly through subsidizing institutionaliza-
tion, or is the program simply taking the elderly oﬀ their children’s hands
and warehousing them in an institution until death?
1.6 Conclusions
The rapid growth of Medicaid, in the face of a continuing rise in the
number of uninsured, suggests that changes to this program, and related el-
igibility expansions such as CHIP, will continue to be a dominant policy is-
sue in the coming years. These changes can be well informed by the large
and growing literature on the Medicaid program. But many unanswered
questions remain. The signiﬁcant advantage of the Medicaid program for
future research is the exciting natural laboratory provided by variation
across states in their program provisions, particularly along the lines of el-
igibility and provider reimbursement. Future work can usefully continue
to exploit this laboratory in answering the remaining questions needed to
intelligently move forward with Medicaid policy.
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